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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes Mongolia’s strategic options in the event of a Mongol-
Chinese confrontation over a clash of interests arising from the potential succession of 
the next Dalai Lama, understood in Mongolia religiously through a process of 
reincarnation. Mongolia would welcome the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation in the country 
since Tibetan Buddhism enjoys the allegiance of many of Mongolia’s people and is a part 
of Mongolia’s national identity.  Mongolia’s democratic government in Ulaanbaatar must 
therefore respond to its people’s religious sentiments. Theoretical considerations 
regarding the rational behavior of small powers suggest that Mongolia would likely seek 
to maximize its interest by manipulating the interests of great powers to balance against 
China. Insight into Ulaanbaatar’s dilemma in such a circumstance may be gained from 
the current cross-Strait politics regarding the Taiwan independence issue, in which voter 
preferences favor Taiwan’s independence and lead it to balance with the United States 
against China’s growing military power. This thesis argues that even though Beijing is 
unlikely to threaten Mongolia with military power since such steps would negatively 
affect its relation with Moscow and its reputation among the international community, it 
could nevertheless exert pressure on Ulaanbaatar. In such a circumstance, American, 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.  THE ISSUE AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE 
This thesis studies the importance of religious identity in Central Asian 
international politics through consideration of an interesting and important possibility: the 
reincarnation of the Fifteenth Dalai Lama in Mongolia. Religion is an important 
component of ethnic identity in the Central Asian regions of Mongolia, Tibet and 
Manchuria. In many cases, such ethnic identity exists in the context of imperfect and 
evolving democratization, contested definitions of nationalism, and conflicts over 
sovereignty as well as international politics. This thesis uses both comparative case 
studies (of Taiwanese nationalism in a similar geo-strategic context) and a hypothetical 
crisis (succession of the Dalai Lama) to investigate these interrelated issues.  
The Dalai Lama is the former king of Tibet and head of its government-in-exile. 
He is simultaneously the leader of Tibetan Buddhism (Lamaism) and the religious leader 
of most Mongolians. China considers the Dalai Lama a threat to its national integrity 
because he is the leader of the Tibetan government-in-exile and proposes to separate 
Tibet from China’s sovereignty. China’s interest in Tibet has a long history. During the 
Qing Empire, which existed until the early 20th century, China consisted of China proper, 
Tibet, Xinjiang, Outer and Inner Mongolia, and Manchuria. These regions (excluding 
Outer Mongolia, but including Inner Mongolia) now account for two-thirds of China’s 
current territory. In the early 20th century, British, Russian, and Japanese interests 
impinged upon Chinese sovereignty in this broad region.  After the 1911 Revolution in 
China, Mongolia and Tibet declared their independence from it. Only Outer Mongolia, 
which had close cultural and religious ties with Tibet, succeeded.  
The region still presents potential threats to Chinese integrity. Author Zhao 
Shuisheng notes that “ethnic nationalism among Tibetans, Uyghurs, other Muslims and 
Mongols has stayed alive and has been evident in the upsurge of separatist 
demonstrations and movements in Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Xinjiang in the 1990’s.”1 
                                                 
1 Shuishen Zhao, “Chinese Nationalism and Its International Orientations” Political Science 
Quarterly, vol. 115, no.1, (Spring  2000) 27. 
2 
The Tibetan government-in-exile still actively functions in Dharmasala, India, under the 
leadership of the Dalai Lama. The Muslim Uyghur separatist movement in Xinjiang has 
allegedly had contact with the former Taliban government of Afghanistan.2 Ethnic 
minorities espousing different religions in China’s western regions potentially constitute 
the same threat to Chinese integrity as Taiwanese independence currently does.  
The succession to the Tibetan throne is one of the key factors that shape the future 
of the Tibetan people. According to Lamaist belief, the 72-year-old Dalai Lama will 
continue to rule Tibet after his death, with his next reincarnation. “Reincarnation is used 
as a principle of succession,” author Melvyn C. Goldstein notes, and “legitimization of 
the individual selected as the incarnation is of critical importance to the successful 
operation of the system.”3  
In this context, the possible reincarnation of the Dalai Lama in Mongolia would 
challenge the Mongol-Chinese relationship. The Tibetan government-in-exile would 
continue to contest China’s sovereignty in Tibet, using religion as an instrument. In 
addition, a Mongol Dalai Lama would likely enjoy popular support not only from Tibet 
and (Outer) Mongolia, but also from Inner Mongolia. Such a succession would challenge 
China’s policy toward Mongolia, and have an impact on China’s approach to the broader 
Asian region. 
Reincarnation of the Dalai Lama in Mongolia is not a certainty; however, it is a 
plausible, or even likely, given three significant factors. First, it is important to examine 
the late Dalai Lama’s speeches and comments, as Goldstein states, “for possible clues as 
to where he would be born.”4 There is a particular commitment by the current Dalai 
Lama that he will reincarnate in a democratic country.5 Mongolia is considered one of the 
successful post-communist democracies. Second, it is a historical fact that the only Dalai 
                                                 
2 Kerry Dumbaugh, “China -U.S. Relations: Current Issues and Implications for U.S. Policy,” CRS 
Report for Congress, September 22, 2006,  23. Dumbaugh noted that “approximately 22 Uighur Muslims 
were being held by U.S. forces at Guantanamo Bay” after the U.S. military operation in Afghanistan. They  
were later released because U.S. forces considered them of “no intelligence value.”  
3 Melvin C. Goldstein, “The Circulation of Estates in Tibet: Reincarnation, Land and Politics,” 
Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 32, no. 3, (May 1973), 446. 
4  Ibid., 446. 
5 “Dalai’s reincarnation will not be found under Chinese Control, Indian Express, 
http:..www.tibet.com/DL/next-reincarnation.html (accessed on July 17, 2006). 
3 
Lama to reincarnate outside of Tibet was a Mongolian in the 16th century. Third, 
Mongolian Buddhists have always maintained good relations with the current Dalai 
Lama, even under Mongolia’s former communist regime. In addition, Mongolia is the 
only independent nation among the three historically Lamaist societies, the others being 
Manchuria and Tibet itself.  
Several important external and internal variables would shape Ulaanbaatar’s 
policy in the event of the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation in Mongolia. The most crucial 
internal factor would be  a potential Buddhist resurgence in Mongolia. The most 
important external factors would be the implications for Beijing, which takes an active 
interest in religious salience in Mongolia, as it could affect Tibet and Mongolian diaspora 
in Inner Mongolia as well. Other critical variables would include U.S., Indian and 
Russian interests. 
Mongolian policy-makers would face serious dilemmas as a consequence of the 
Dalai Lama’s reincarnation in Mongolia. The country has been on a path towards 
democratization since the 1990’s, and politicians must address the interests of their 
constituencies. Will the politicians respond to the religious pressures of the Mongolian 
people in opposition to pressures from Beijing? Or, will they concede to China and 
sacrifice Mongolia’s traditional religious ties with Tibet for the sake of the nation’s 
security, thus putting their political careers at risk? These are the main questions of this 
thesis. 
This scenario has parallels with the issue of Taiwanese independence, which are 
manifest in both internal and external factors...Domestic factors include voters’ 
preferences and the polarization of political parties. External factors include China’s 
military threat, Sino-Taiwanese economic interdependence, and the ambiguous U.S. 
promise to counter China’s threat. The people of Taiwan have repeatedly elected a pro-
independence president since 2000; however, Beijing’s threat against separatism plays 
the most important conditional factor for these policy matters. Externally, Taiwan is 
gradually maximizing its independence claim by manipulating U.S. security interests. 
These factors all contribute to an excellent case study of what would likely happen in 
Ulaanbaatar in the event of a Mongol-Chinese clash of interests.  
4 
Mongolia’s current “third neighbor” policy reflects its ambition to maximize its 
national interests by balancing a powerful “third” actor against its two immediate 
neighbors, Russia and China. So far, the “third neighbor” policy has been well 
implemented. Mongolia’s military deployment in Iraq, regardless of its neighbors’ 
reservations about U.S. policy, is one successful departure from this policy. But such a 
policy would face a serious challenge in the case of the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation in 
Mongolia, which would directly affect China’s security interests. Mongolia, unlike 
Taiwan, is recognized by the PRC as an independent nation. Beijing is therefore not 
likely to invade Mongolia with its superior military power since it would violate the 
fundamental principle of its foreign policy – respecting national sovereignty – which 
Beijing also employs in resisting U.S. pressures on China itself. The best option for 
Beijing would be cooperation with Mongolia’s anti-Dalai Lama parties to deter growing 
religious sentiment in Mongolia. 
The conclusion of this thesis is that Mongolia would try to maximize its interest 
by acceding to voters’ religious preferences, but be limited by the national security threat 
from China. Ulaanbaatar will aim to balance U.S. and Indian interests against China’s. 
Such maximization, however, cannot extend beyond the interests of its neighbors. The 
theoretical studies of this thesis therefore examine the relationship between great and 
small powers and the strategies of small powers.  
The simplest way for Mongolia to avoid the dilemma is to engage the traditional 
Mongolian religious leader, Ninth Khalkha Jebtsundampa Bogd Gegeen, in decision-
making on religious issues, including the question of whether to recognize the next Dalai 
Lama’s reincarnation. This course would help Ulaanbaatar to assuage the Mongolian 
electorate’s religious sentiments, while remaining neutral in religious affairs and avoiding 
a political confrontation with Beijing. 
This thesis will present policy options of practical use to Mongolian policy-
makers. The issue is also of interest to the United States, India and China; this thesis 
could help the countries to plan and adapt their policy response. 
 
5 
B.  DISCUSSION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.  Background 
The role of Buddhism in Mongolian history and Mongolian ties to Tibet are 
controversial. Basic discussions of this topic consider social and cultural effects of 
Buddhism throughout the history of Mongolia and historical evaluation of political 
intentions behind the introduction, conversion to, and practice of Buddhism. 
Some argue that Mongolia’s conversion to Buddhism was not the result of foreign 
initiative. Jagchid Sechin notes that Mongol-Tibetan Buddhist relations began well before 
the foundation of the Manchu Qing Dynasty in the early 17th century. According to 
Sechin, conversion to Buddhism was a “progressive adaptation necessary for successful 
adjusting to the modern world.”6 Robert Rupin supports this argument, observing that 
Mongolian nationalism in the early 20th century was “inseparable from Buddhism.”7 
Guiseppe Tucci has argued that during the Mongol Yuan dynasty of the 13th and 
14th centuries, Mongolians used Buddhism to intervene in Tibetan affairs and promote 
colonization. In the 16th and 17th centuries, the Dalai Lama’s religious dominance in 
Tibet relied heavily on Mongolian military intervention in Tibet’s internal religious 
rivalries.8 Similarly, the Manchus used Lamaism to control both Mongolia and Tibet. 
Walter Heissig asserts that Buddhism was promoted by the Manchus to rule Mongolia, 
but he remarks that the religion had a positive impact on Mongolian social life.9 
Alan Sanders does not agree that Buddhism had a positive impact on Mongolian 
social life. Early twentieth century statistics show that a significant number of the 
population, especially males, were lamas. This had a tremendous negative impact on 
social life, absorbing labor from the economy and slowing the pace of modernization. 
Sanders cites a number of statistics that Russian researchers and explorers I. Ovdiyenko, 
                                                 
6 Jagchid Sechin, Mongolia’s Culture and Society ( Boulder: Westview Press, 1979), 177. 
7 Robert Rupin, How Mongolia Is Really Ruled: A Political History of the People’s Republic of 
Mongolia 1900-1978 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), 12. R. L. Worden, A. M. Savada, and H. 
Lohninger ed., Mongolia: Library of Congress Country Studies, (Epina Software Lab, 2004), 
http://www.photoglobe.info/ebooks/mongolia/cstudies_mongolia_0075.html  (accessed June 5, 2007). 
8 Giuseppe Tucci, The Religion of Tibet (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1980), 40-41. 
9 Walther Heissig, The Religion of Mongolia (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1980), 33. 
6 
I. Mayskiy, V. Maslennikov and others produced during their expeditions to early 
Mongolia.10 According to Sanders, this was the result of a deliberate policy of Manchu 
and Tibetan lamas to prevent a Mongolian insurgency against the Manchu Qing Dynasty. 
In the 20th century, the socialist literature of the Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR) 
supported this idea to undercut Buddhism’s role in Mongolia. 
Mongolia, Tibet and Manchuria had strong strong religious ties. The balance of 
power between the three peoples and their policies toward each other were strongly 
shaped by the common religious allegiance they shared -- Lamaism. Once the Manchu 
Qing Dynasty collapsed in 1912, the Lamaist tripolar system fell with it, and a bipolar tie 
between Mongolia and Tibet resulted. However, events such as the communist revolution 
in Mongolia and the Chinese invasion of Tibet in 20th century ended the bipolar 
relationship. 
2.  Reincarnation and Politics 
Because there is no exact rule to determine the reincarnation, except for the secret 
knowledge derived from the art of divination, politics can play a role in the process..  
The Karmapa sect of Tibetan Buddhism was the first to use the process of 
reincarnation to solidify its position. Soon thereafter, other sects began to practice this 
concept and to incarnate their own lamas. Since the 12th century, the leadership of all of 
the major sects have determined succession through incarnation. Franz Michael classified 
the roles of reincarnation of lamas into three categories: Dalai Lama himself, the leaders 
of major sects, and the leader of the monasteries.11  
Tsung-Lien Shen and Shen-Chi Liu recorded the most detailed process of 
recognition of the next Dalai Lama reincarnation during the Manchu Qing Empire. 
Guided by the prophecy of the previous Dalai Lama or by the instruction of the highest 
monks, who were the only individuals who could read the signs of rebirth, several 
scouting teams would go on a mission to search for the reincarnated Dalai Lama. These 
scouting teams would name candidates for the reincarnated Dalai Lama based on their 
                                                 
10 Alan J.Sanders, The People’s Republic of Mongolia (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 66. 
11 Franz Michael, Rule by Incarnation: Tibetan Buddhism and Its Role in Society and State (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1982), 43. 
7 
findings and bring them to Lhasa. After special praying rituals, the Manchu governor, 
appointed by the Manchu Qing emperor, who was also widely believed to be an 
incarnation of Lord Manchushir, chose one candidate’s name from rolled papers. This 
selection process of the next Dalai Lama during the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912), by the 
decree of the Qianlong Emperor, resembled a lottery.12  
In other instances, one of the candidates clearly showed credible signs of being 
the reincarnated Dalai Lama and was therefore chosen as the successor unanimously by 
all of the lamas. This was the case with both the present Dalai Lama and his 
predecessor.13 
Along with the art of divination, politics has always had a place in the selection 
process.  As Franz Michael notes:  
It was in that order that a new concept of highest religious leadership, as 
well as of political authority, was introduced: the concept of the 
incarnation of a religious leader as a living bodhisattva.14 
The historical evidence supporting this point is quite credible. During the Qing 
Dynasty, the Emperor was a patron of  Lamaism and was able to rule incarnation without 
any knowledge of the art of divination, to restrict rebirth not to those from “powerful 
noble families, but always from humble stock.”15 The last two Dalai Lamas’ incarnations 
have been recognized without drawing lots, which seems to have had the political 
purpose of  circumventing Chins’s interference in the Dalai Lama recognition after the 
collapse of Manchu Qing Dynasty.  
Most scholars agree that the identification of the Fourth Dalai Lama’s incarnation 
in Mongolia in the late 16th century was clearly politically motivated “to secure Mongol 
support”16 against rival sects in Tibet. The Third Dalai Lama went to Mongolia to appeal 
                                                 
12 Tsung-Lien Shen and Shen-Chi Liu, Tibet and Tibetan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1953), 
89-101. 
13 Ibid., 101. 
14 Michael, 37.  
15 Shen and Liu,101. 
16 Michael, 41. 
8 
for support and then died there eight years later.17  The Fourth Dalai Lama, a Mongolian,  
was the only foreign incarnation among the Dalai Lama’s fourteen incarnations.  
Historians agree that reincarnation has always mixed international politics with 
domestic politics. As discussed earlier, it was instituted to strengthen a particular sect’s 
position. The case of the Qianlong Emperor’s decree showed direct political interference 
in the recognition of the next incarnation. The fact that the Fourth Dalai Lama was the 
only foreign lama demonstrates not only a deep religious association between the two 
peoples, but also the political nature of the reincarnation itself. 
3.  Buddhism in Mongolian Foreign Politics  
Researchers have studied the cultural aspects of Mongolian foreign policy from 
different points of view, though not necessarily in contradiction with one another. 
Generally, four different perspectives have emerged in the field.  
Judith Nordby suggests that Mongolia used Buddhism as a way to reach out to the 
Third World, even during the communist regime.18 Robert Rupin specifically cites the 
Asian Buddhist Peace Conference in 1970, which addressed the Dalai Lama issue and 
Chinese policy toward Tibet; however, he hesitates to offer any explicit conclusion.19 
Even though lamaism was strongly suppressed in socialist Mongolia, the government 
nevertheless invited the Dalai Lama, who visited the Mongolian People’s Republic in 
1979 and 1982. It was perhaps the result of an effort by an individual leader of 
Mongolian Lamaism to survive the oppressive regime using its own communist ideology 
of proletarian internationalism. 
Post-communist Mongolian foreign policy studies are radically different with 
respect to the impact of culture, reflecting the situation since the Soviet and communist 
bloc collapsed. National interests now determine Mongolian foreign policy. 
Geopolitically, Mongolia’s location, history and strategic context challenge its survival as 
                                                 
17 Tieh-Tseng Li, The Historical Status of Tibet (New York: King’s Crown Press, 1956), 31.  
18 Judith Nordby, “The Mongolian People’s Republic in 1980’s: Continuity and Changes,” in  
Communism and Reform in East Asia, ed. David Goodman (London Totowa: Frank Cass), 126. 
19 Rupin, 19. 
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an independent nation. Many researchers therefore raise questions about the problem of 
identity or national and cultural self-consciousness in Mongolia. 
Tom Ginsburg has developed the idea of “cosmopolitan nationalism” to explain 
Mongolians’ attitude toward foreign policy. He understands “cosmopolitan nationalism” 
as “the affinity between nationalist goals and internationalist ideology,” which has 
“produced a configuration of ideas and rhetoric among the elite.”20  Origins of the 
phenomenon are culturally rooted in conflict between settled and nomadic cultures. 
Ginsburg agrees with Lattimore that Mongolian nationalism is based on the traditional 
fear of Chinese settlement on the best part of Mongolian territory and displacement of 
nomadic Mongolians, which would crush its culture and way of life--a fate that was given 
to American Indians.21 Therefore: 
The deep cultural drive to distinguish themselves from the Chinese 
ensures that Mongolian nationalism is always perfectly consistent with 
internationalism, as long as internationalism offers hopes of a security 
guarantee vis-a-vis China.22  
Ginsburg further analyzes how this nationalism pushed the country towards an 
alliance with the Soviets and how it finds its expression in current Mongolian political 
life. A “third neighbor” policy, which is the practical policy consequence of  
cosmopolitan nationalism, finds expression of the national drive to overcome Mongolia’s 
disadvantageous landlocked geopolitical position and to balance or neutralize the 
influence of its bigger neighbors.23 
In his book Mongolia’s Foreign Policy in the 1990’s: New Identity and New 
Challenges, Professor Batbayar Tsedendamba finds Mongolia facing a different cultural 
dilemma in regard to its geopolitical location between Central Asia and East Asia.24 He 
points out that Lamaist relations between Mongolia and Tibet pose a “risk factor” that 
                                                 
20 Thomas Ginsburg, “Nationalism, Elites and Mongolia’s Rapid Transition,” in Mongolia and XX 
Century: Landlocked Cosmopolitans, ed. Stephen Kotkin (New York and London: M.E.Sharpe, 1999), 
248-249. 
21 Ibid., 249. 
22 Ibid., 249. 
23 Ibid., 254-256. 
24 Batbayar Tsedendamba, “Mongolia’s Foreign Policy in the 1990’s: New Identity and New 
Challenges,” Regional Security Issues and Mongolia. vol.17, (2002) 148-150. 
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might affect Mongol-Chinese relations, which he defines as a pillar of national stability. 
Bilateral relations were “negatively affected” by every visit of the Dalai Lama, and the 
government of Mongolia had to address Beijing about the religious freedom of its people. 
Tsedendamba blames the Dalai Lama for using religion for his own political purpose. An 
example of the Dalai Lama’s attempt to use religion “in his political game against Beijing 
and reassert his influence in Mongolia” is the Ninth Jebtsundampa. The Ninth 
Jebtsundampa is the reincarnation of the last religious leader and king of the Bogd Khan 
Kingdom of Mongolia. He declared the country’s independence from the Manchu Qing 
Dynasty on December 30, 1911. The Ninth Jebtsundampa was enthroned as a Mongolian 
religious leader by the Dalai Lama in 1991 and by Mongolian religious leaders in 1999 
during his the only visit to Mongolia.25 However, Batbayar does not explain how the 
Lamaist relationship between Mongolia and Tibet, including all of the Living Buddhas, 
can negatively affect the relationship between China and Mongolia.  
When Batbayar was writing his book, India appointed Bakula Renpuchi, a 
Buddhist monk who had close relations with the Dalai Lama, as ambassador to Mongolia. 
He played an active role in the restoration of communist-destroyed temples and 
monasteries. Renpuchi and Mongolia’s then Minister of Culture and current president, 
Nambaryn Enkhbayar, made joint efforts to bring the Buddha’s ashes to Ulaanbaatar.  
Moreover, he repeatedly visited Mongolia in the 1990s. Batbayar does not provide a clear 
account of how these events could risk Mongol-Chinese relations. 
Munkh-Ochir Dorjjugder sees a trilemma in Mongolian identity. He determines 
identity based on how Mongolians perceive themselves, and not from their geopolitical 
location, as Batbayar does. Central Asian nomadic tradition, East Asian Lamaist religion, 
and East European communist habits are the main factors that shaped Mongolians’ 
perception about themselves.26 Further, he correlates these identities with the current 
interests of the nation. Self-identification of Mongolians as East Asians thereby shapes 
the role of culture in the nation’s current foreign policy. 
                                                 
25 .Batbayar, 48. 
26 Munkh-Ochir Dorjjugder, ”Correlation of Identity and Interest in Foreign Policy: Implications for 
Mongolia” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2003), 43 – 60.  
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In conclusion, Buddhism is commonly viewed in a historical and cultural context. 
Mongolian communists briefly used this religious factor for condemning Chinese Tibetan 
policy. The relationship between Mongolia and the Dalai Lama today, however, is 
viewed as a risk factor in Mongol-Chinese relation. 
4.  Unanswered Questions and Challenges 
All researchers agree that a strong Lamaist relationship existed between 
Mongolia, Tibet and Manchuria. These ties played a significant role in the assimilation of 
these people. They were also sometimes used to exploit one another politically.   
These relations no longer exist. Most researchers today do not discuss Lamaism in 
Mongolia’s current and future foreign policy, although Batbayar sees the relationship 
between Mongolia and the Dalai Lama as a risk factor in Mongolian-Chinese relations. 
One can assume that India’s engagement with Mongolia through religious ties is a 
relatively modest attempt to affect Chinese interest. In light of this, it is important to 
examine what would happen if Mongolia faces the most radical possibility of the Dalai 
Lama’s reincarnation in Mongolia. Would “East Asian Buddhist” culture be determinant 
in such a case? How much pressure would the country face and how would it respond?  
This thesis focuses on these questions. 
C.  METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis will use the case study method to analyze the impact of the Dalai 
Lama’s possible reincarnation in Mongolia on Mongolia’s foreign policy, especially its 
policy with China. Taiwan’s actions in the context of its independence claim under 
China’s threat have prompted many interesting discussions among scholars, which may 
be useful in examining the effects of the Dalai Lama’s possible reincarnation in 
Mongolia. 
The strong Taiwanese identity is the basis of Taiwan’s nationalism and 
independence claims; however, scholars debate how much risk the Mongolian people are 
willing to tolerate in order to maintan these claims. The electorates’ policy preferences,  
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whether Taiwanese or Chinese or both, have changed from time to time.27 Robert Ross 
explains that a decrease in popular support for independence in recent years is associated 
with an increase of external threats.28 In contrast, Bevin Chu argues that the defining 
factor of such a decrease is the increase in self-identification of the Taiwenese people as 
Chinese.29 
Phillip Sanders observes that political and economic relations across the Taiwan 
Strait have developed in opposite directions.30 Taiwan’s independence claim jeopardizes 
the political relations,, as opposed to rapidly integrating the two economies. The domestic 
politics of Taiwan reflect this tension. The Pan Green coalition, consisting of the 
Democratic Progress Party, the Taiwan Solidarity Union and others, pursues the 
independence claim. The Pan Blue coalition, consisting of the Kuomintang Party and the 
People’s First Party, rejects this independence ideology, but desires peaceful unification 
with China. The Chinese Communist Party is actively developing party-to-party relations 
with the Pan Blue coalition parties as leverage in discouraging Taiwan independence 
claim.31  
China’s military capacity for power projection in the Taiwan Strait is debated 
among scholars.32 However, the Anti-Secession Law adopted by the National Congress 
of the PRC showed China’s firm commitment to war in the case of Taiwan’s declaration 
                                                 
27 David A. Newberry, “Democratic Chaos: How Taiwanese Democracy Destabilized Cross-Strait 
Relations,” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005), 24 -25. 
28 Robert S. Ross, “Taiwan’s Fading Independence Movement,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2006, 
146. 
29 Bevin Chu, “Dying for Taiwan Independence,” The China Desk, April 8, 2005, 
http://thechinadesk.tripod.com/dying_for_ti.htm  (accessed June 5, 2007). 
30 Philip Sanders, “Long-Term Trends in China- Taiwan Relations: Implications for U.S. Taiwan 
Policy,” Asian Survey, vol. 45, no.6, (Nov-Dec, 2005) 987 – 989. 
31 Chris Buckley, “Opposition Visit Begins for Taiwan Nationalists,” International Herald Tribune, 
April 27, 2005, http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/04/26/news/china.php  (accessed April 30, 2005). 
32 Discussion about the PRC capacity of power projection and military dominance. Bates Gill and 
Michael O’Hanlon, ‘’China’s Hollow Military” in China Cross Talk: The American Debate over China 
Policy since Normalization,  Scott Kennedy ed. (Lanham, Boulder, New York, Oxford; Rowman & 
Littlefield Publisher, Inc, 2003) 201 -209. James Lilley and Carl Ford “China’s Military: A Second 
Opinion” Ibid., 210 -218.  
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of independence. The U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity deters both sides from taking  
radical steps, but Washington may change this policy due to developments in the strait.33 
The Dalai Lama’s possible reincarnation in Mongolia and its consequent impact 
in Mongolian policy-making shares parallels with the rise of the Taiwanese independence 
movement and its impact in cross-Taiwan Strait relations. Both Mongolia and Taiwan 
have made relatively successful transitions to democracy. China is the most important 
factor of both countries’ foreign policies. The only difference between them is that 
Mongolia is universally recognized as an independent nation. Taiwan has not been 
recognized as such, but has claimed the right of self-determination for more than a 
decade. A close study of the Taiwanese independence case, current politics in Taiwan, 
and Chinese intervention in Taiwanese politics may help to illuminate the possible 
outcomes of the Dalai Lama’s possible reincarnation in Mongolia. . 
1.  Selection of the Case 
Cases were chosen on the basis of numerous similar factors. Mongolia and 
Taiwan share the following characteristics: 
- Democratic systems hold policy makers responsible to voters.  
- There are voters’ preferences that have an impact on the interests of the great 
powers that affect Mongolia’s foreign policy. 
- Both are small powers that both are not influential in world affairs and are 
vulnerable to powerful neighbors.  
- Growing Chinese power is the most important factor shaping both countries’ 
foreign policy. Both countries are among the first to be affected by Chinese 
internal reform and expanding international influence. 
-  
                                                 
33 Robert S. Ross argues that the United States can easily deter the PRC from invading Taiwan.  
Robert S. Ross, “Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation Dominance, and U.S.-China 
Relations” International Security, vol.. 27, no. 4, (Fall 2002) 49. Phillip Sanders, unlike Ross, concludes 
that U.S. might come to change policy of strategic ambiguity to clarity in the future. Sanders, “Long – 
Term Trends in China – Taiwan Relations,” 991. 
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2.  Hypothesis and the Case Selection 
The thesis hypothesis is that the Dalai Lama’s potential reincarnation in Mongolia 
would produce a new agenda in Mongolian internal politics. Politicians would  likely 
split into two camps -- supporters and opponents of the Dalai Lama with regard to policy 
towards China.34 The two factions are likely to advance different principles and policies. 
The supporters’ main argument will probably stress the principle of democratic 
governance and argue that any government policy, including foreign policy, should 
reflect the people’s will. Neither national politicians nor foreign powers may dictate or 
correct voters’ preferences. The oppositions’ main argument will likely be the principle 
of secularism and concern for security: no reincarnated Tibetan Lama should dictate the 
foreign policy of Mongolia, because it could threaten the nation’s democracy and 
security. 
Chinese policy with Mongolia and its democratic system may become very 
similar to its current policy with Taiwan. Beijing cannot directly interfere with 
Mongolian voters’ preferences or threaten with military force. However, it will support 
the opposition against supporters of the Dalai Lama, using an approach paralleling its 
influence of Taiwan’s politics regarding independence. Therefore, the cross-Strait politics 
of the Taiwanese independence case is useful to test the hypothesis of this thesis. 
Taiwan is a democracy in consolidation.  Taiwan suffered strong Kuomintang or 
Nationalist Party (KMT) rule for about 40 years. KMT governance was characterized by 
minority rule by wealthy and conservative nationalist Chinese refugees who had fled 
from the mainland. Taiwan’s indigenous population was different from the mainlanders 
and they did not want to assimilate, but preferred independence to Chinese unification. 
Chiang Kai-Shek and his son strongly suppressed the political will of the indigenous 
population. 
Lee Teng–hui, the successor of Chiang Jian-Guo, was a native Taiwanese. He 
ceased the state of emergency that had lasted since the KMT flee to Taiwan, starting 
                                                 
34 Discussion board on internet version of little newspaper article about possible invitation of Bogd 
Gegeen to engage religious administration 80 years later, clearly shows this trend.  Participants were 
divided into two groups: supporters of Bogd Gegeen and opposers. G.Nergui, “Inviting Bogd Gegeen was 
discussed” [in Mongolian] Ardyn erh, April 18, 2006, http://www.sonin.mn/?p=1249#more-1249  
(accessed June 2007). 
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political liberalization and a democratic transition. When Taiwan gradually transitioned to 
democracy, the electorate voted in 2000 for Chen Shui-bian, the leader of the opposition party, 
who promised independence. Chen Shui-bian’s policies, however, have been pragmatic. He has 
not declared Taiwanese independence, which would provoke war with the PRC. Sometimes 
democratization of Taiwan sounds like the Taiwanization of politics and raises the security 
concerns of internal publics and external powers.35 
China’s behavior in this context has been interesting. China uses elements of Taiwan’s 
democratic regime to pursue its interests. Meanwhile, externally, it threatens to use military 
power. China collaborates with the KMT and People First Party (PFP) to contain DPP actions 
toward independence. A similar scenario may be observed in Mongolia. 
3.  Sources 
Primary sources for thesis research will include government documents of Taiwan and 
the PRC, as well as the Tibetan government-in-exile. Documents published on the internet will be 
used, especially in the case of analyzing the positions of the Taiwanese government and the 
Tibetan government-in-exile. The Dalai Lama’s statements in regard to his reincarnation are 
another primary source..  
Interviews with policy-makers can be the best primary source regarding policy. 
Competent analysts and government officials share valuable and reliable opinions about the 
matter, especially with respect to conditional predictions in the thesis, such as the possibility of 
the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation in Mongolia and Mongolian policy options. 
Relevant books and articles are helpful in explaining government positions. The 
literature is rich in comparison to government documents.. In particular, it provides 
detailed explanations regarding Sino-Taiwanese relations and Tibetan rebel against 
Chinese rule. Obviously, there is almost no literature available about the political impact 
of the possibility of the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation in Mongolia. However, literature 
addressing the Sino-Taiwanese and Sino-Mongolian relationships are beneficial to 
learning about the unique facets of these relationships.  
                                                 
35 Robert A. Scalapino, “Taiwan – Opportunities and Challenges” in Taiwan’s National Security: 
Dilemmas and Opportunities. ed. Alexander C. Tan and others, eds. (Wiltshire: Antony Rowe Ltd, 2001). 
1-17; Cal Clark, “Successful Democratization in the ROC: Creating a Security Challenge” in ibid 19 – 59; 
Chia-Lung Lin, “National Identity and Taiwan Security” in ibid. 60 – 83.  The book is a collection of 
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II.  FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE THE STRATEGY OF SMALL 
COUNTRIES 
As a rational actor, a small power attempts to maximize its interests. The most 
immediate interest of a small power is survival. The difference between a great and a 
small country is the inherent power imbalance. This chapter examines international 
relations theories of small state behavior in preparation for subsequent analysis that 
specifically applies them to Mongolian and Taiwanese relations with China.  
The first part of the chapter will discuss the inherent features of a small country 
and its international environment. The second part will discuss the limits of great powers 
and their policy priorities, which are different from those of small states and constrain 
such states’ freedom of action. The third section discusses the possible common 
strategies in the context of small states’ behavior. The fourth part summarizes the factors 
that directly influence a small state’s behavior. The chapter will conclude with a brief 
summary of the discussions. 
A.  A SMALL POWER AND ITS INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
1.  Inability and Vulnerability 
A small power’s behavior is shaped by two inherent factors -- its inability to 
influence the global security environment and its vulnerability to attacks from a great 
power. In the world of anarchy, these threaten survival. Small powers, therefore, always 
feel insecure and threatened by others. 
A lack of influence in the world order is an inherent characteristic of a small 
power. A country is a “small power” because its ability to shape other countries’ behavior 
is greatly limited compared to great powers, which enjoy a far greater influence. Murari 
Raj Sharma explains that the existing international system shapes not only external 
threats to territorial integrity, but also internal factors such as economic, social, 
environmental and technological securities.36 Small countries, therefore, react to the 
existing world order rather than  being proactive or shaping the international system. 
                                                 
36 Murari Raj Sharma, “Security of Small States,” Regional Security Issues and Mongolia. vol. 7, 
(Ulaanbaatar: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997). 
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“Small” and “great” are determined relative to the distribution of power between 
states. Small states are allocated fewer means for survival than others, and they are 
always haunted by feelings of insecurity and vulnerability to great powers. Small states 
can do little to change this. To a small power, everything looks large and fearsome. 
The realist theory is therefore useful to explain a small power’s behavior. John J. 
Mearsheimer’s realist assumptions are valid and particularly important for small powers’ 
behavior. Great powers compete to shape the world order in their favor, and this 
competition directly affects small states. Small powers, in turn, can do nothing about it. 
Small countries stay outside of the competition, but are incredibly dependent on it. 
Furthermore, “the great powers inherently possess some offensive military capability,”37 
which by nature threatens a small power’s security. Small powers “can never be certain 
about other states’ intentions,”38 and “survival is the primary goal”39 of any small power 
in such an imbalanced world. 
2.  Contiguity and Vulnerability  
The relationship between power and fear with regard to nuclear weapons, 
geographic contiguity and the distribution of power affects the relationship between great 
and small powers in specific ways.40  
Variables such as distance between small and great powers play a decisive role in 
the security of small powers. A small power is more vulnerable to its larger neighbors 
that share a common border, but rarely vulnerable to distant powers.  Sharing a common 
border, on the one hand, diminishes the great neighbor's nuclear threat to a small power. 
Nuclear damage would devastate a great power as much as it would the target state. A 
nearby powerful neighbor, on the other hand, increases the threat of a conventional 
military offense. “Proximity is important to the escalation of disputes,” Susan G. Sample 
                                                 
37 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politic (New York, London; W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2001) 30. 
38 Ibid, 31. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid., 40- 46. 
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writes.41 In a case of an immediate neighborhood, such as Mongolia, which sandwiched 
between two powers, proximity cancels the effect of the multi-polar world order. 
Mongolia’s policy during the Cold War did not reflect the global Soviet-U.S. bipolar 
competition so much as the hostility of the Soviet-China relationship, a rivalry within the 
camp. 
The importance of a large body of water is also significant to the relationships 
between great and small powers. Tibet was easily invaded by China despite its 
mountainous terrain. Taiwan, on the other hand, still maintains its quasi-independence 
from the PRC. This example also illustrates the role of an overwhelming land force and 
limited sea power. 42 
An example of an exception to this is Vietnam. It allied with the Soviet Union and 
went to war against China in 1979. Although Vietnam shares the land border with China, 
it is isolated by a large body of water from the Soviet Union. Distance and geography 
played negative roles in Vietnam’s alliance policy. 
Vietnam, however, is not a surprising case in light of two other factors. The 
Soviet Union provided military assistance to Hanoi against China. Therefore, the case can 
be explained as balancing the Soviet Union against China. Furthermore, Vietnam's case 
supports Frederic S. Pearson’s findings that “if grievances in a nearby target are great 
enough, a country may attack and oppose the target government despite power 
disadvantages.” 43 A small power will go to war if its very existence in stake. Taiwan and 
Mongolia could have the same reaction if they found themselves under the same threat 
from China. 
 
                                                 
41 Susan G. Sample, “The Outcome of Military Buildups: Minor States vs. Major Powers,” Journal of 
Peace Research, vol. 39, no.6, (Nov., 2002): 679. 
42 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 44. Mearsheimer  explains the importance of 
large body of water with the  fact that the United States was never attacked by foreign powers thanks to two 
oceans separating it from a hostile powers. The continental powers, in contrast, constantly invaded each 
others. Further, he emphasizes the importance of land military power, which led the country to final 
victory, unlike others such as naval and air powers, which primary goal is to support ground troops: “The 
Primacy of Land Power,” Ibid.  
43 Frederic S. Pearson, “Geographic Proximity and Foreign Military Intervention,” The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, vol.18, no.3, (September 1974), 450. 
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3.  A Buffer State 
The buffer state is a specific phenomenon of a small country's geo-strategic 
environment.  Buffer states always exist in bipolarity, where two major powers mutually 
fear each other.  The security reassurance between these two major powers is the very 
existence of the small and weak buffer state, whose only goal is separation of the two 
powers’ military forces and prevention of direct confrontation. 
Mearsheimer explains that compared to the multi-polar system, the bipolar sytem 
is one of the most stable orders of the world. In contrast to a “less firmly structured” 
multi-polarity, the bipolar world is a “rigid structure.” The competition of two great 
powers is not ambiguous and minor powers should adjust to it.  In multipolarity, the 
asymmetries of power lead to more inequality. Therefore, “the potential miscalculation” 
is greater than in a bipolar system, where the asymmetries tend to be equal.44  
 These assumptions are valid in the case of a bipolarity surrounding a minor 
buffer power. The calculation that one who allies with a buffer state will enjoy an 
advantage over the other is clear. It also provides an opportunity for a buffer state to 
exploit the fears of both neighboring powers for its own interest. The buffer state’s policy 
of alliance plays a critical role in the security policy of the stronger neighbors.  
B.  LIMITS OF A GREAT POWER 
1.  Relationship with Other Powers 
The world order is the main concern of great powers and a main restraint of great 
powers' behavior. This section discusses how the relationship of a great power with other 
great powers can restrain its behavior toward a small power. A great power’s worldwide 
interests and the importance of relationships with other powers are critical factors. . 
A great power has a range of interests throughout the region and the world, which 
lead the great power to carefully divide its resources and efforts into various parts of the 
world. This gives a comparative advantage to a small country to advance its position over 
the great power in a certain focused area of policy. Thomas Christensen argues that U.S. 
forces are sparsely distributed all over the world and tied with various interests in 
                                                 
44 Mearsheimer, 339 – 344. 
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different regions. If China concentrated its power solely on the Taiwan Strait, China 
would easily control the strait. Christenson cites Niu Jun, who writes that the “strategic 
line” of the United States is “too long” and stretches around the world, and that U.S. 
power is “scattered” throughout it.45 This assessment is valid not only in U.S.-China 
relations, but also in other asymmetric power relationships. China is tied to at least three 
different areas -- the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan Strait, and India and Central Asia. A 
small country with a concentrated force could take advantage of a U.S.  distraction. 
A great power places more importance on its relationship with other great powers. 
Disputes among the great powers are more likely to escalate to war, compared to disputes 
between two small states or between great and small states.46 Competition between a 
status quo power and challenging power is a question of life or death. A great power's 
priorities in its foreign policy restrain its policy with a small power. This restraint can 
clearly be seen in a buffer state case. Mongolia is a buffer state between Russia and 
China. Both great powers formulate policy with Mongolia in the context of its policy 
toward other great powers. Indeed, the existence of a buffer state relies on the mutual 
fears of competing powers.  
2.  International Institutions 
International institutions are one of the limiting factors that tie the hands of great 
powers. Theories explain the effects of the international institutions in many different 
ways. These explanations can be divided into two main categories of how they restrain 
the behavior of great powers--the nature of common economic interests, or a state’s 
selfish rational calculation. 
Liberalist theory explains that international institutions prevent conflicts in 
several ways. To begin with, countries that benefit from international trade have a 
common interest to keep the international free trade organizations as they are. 
Furthermore, a democratic country’s behavior is transparent and predictable, which 
reduces the uncertainty of another country’s intentions and reassures the security 
                                                 
45 Thomas Christensen, “Posing Problems without Catching Up: China’s Rise and Challenges for U.S. 
Security Policy,” International Security, vol. 25, no.4 (Spring 2001), 20. 
46 Sample, 679. 
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concern.47 Additionally, the international organizations and institutions may constrain the 
great power from an aggressive undertaking with binding legal obligations and economic 
profits. “Coercing norm-breakers” with a military force under the international 
organization's mandate is one possible measure. “Mediating among conflicting parties” 
with a legal capacity and “conveying information” to clear each others’ intention can 
reduce the cost of both parties to peacefully resolve the problem.48  
John G. Ikenberry supports the thesis that the international organizations provide 
stability in the world, but he argues it is through states’ rational calculation. The 
international institutions reduce the returns of power, but increase the returns of 
institutions. Member states' behavior, including that of great powers, is bound in the 
“predictable courses of action,” which the author refers to as a lock- in effect of the 
international institutions.49 The international organizations do not directly change the 
distribution of power; however, they increase the cost of aggression.  
In this regard, Ulaanbaatar views the United Nations and other regional security 
institutions as important for “protecting its national interests through its political and 
diplomatic means.”50 Unlike Taiwan, Mongolia’s UN membership and its recognition by 
the international community as an independent nation guarantee Mongolia’s sovereignty 
and make an aggression against the nation expensive in terms of international politics. 
Through the participating UN Peacekeeping Operation and other means, Mongolia seeks 
to gain high prestige among the community of nations. 
C.  POLICY OPTIONS FOR A SMALL POWER 
International relations theory looks at two main survival strategies of states -- 
balancing and bandwagoning. Balancing is allying against a threatening power, while 
                                                 
47 Bruce Russet and John Oneal, “Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and 
International Organizations,” (New York, London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), 54. 
48 Russet and Oneal,, 163-164. 
49 John G. Ikenberry, “Institution, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar 
Order,” International Security. vol 23, no. 3 (Winter, 1998 – 1999), 55-56. 
50 Diplomatic Bluebook 2006 (Ulaanbaatar: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006), 188. 
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bandwagoning is allying with the threatening power.51 Omni-balancing is a specific 
policy option for Third World countries with government regimes that are usually 
characterized as oppressive and undemocratic.52 
1.  Balancing 
Balancing against the threat of a great power is the best option for keeping state 
power; however, it is a difficult mission to accomplish. Mearsheimer describes three 
kinds of balancing behaviors -- signaling war or expressing the state’s commitment to a 
war if another state’s hostile action threatens the state’s vital interests; external balancing, 
where the threatened state seeks an alliance to balance against the threatening power; and 
internal balancing, where the threatened state mobilizes its national resources to deter the 
aggressor.53 
For a small power, balancing means external balancing – allying with one major 
power against another. Clearly, signaling commitment to war against a great power and 
internal balancing with scarce resources are not viable options for small states. Even at its 
full mobilization capacity, a small power may not balance the major power if the power 
gap is too wide. An example is the Mongolian alliance with the Soviet Union against 
China. Mongolia had a highly effective mobilization system under the communist 
ideology in the 1960’s, but it was no match against China’s overwhelming military 
power, which threatened its territorial integrity. Mongolia had no choice other than 
external balancing with the Soviet Union. 
Stephen M. Walt identifies two reasons for balancing strategy. The first is to 
balance a weaker power against a stronger, and the second is to seek a relatively greater 
influence over the weaker side.54 Small powers seek relative advantage, not greater 
influence, in the alliance. China’s invasion of Tibet and the Great Leap Forward policy of 
                                                 
51 Stephen M. Walt, “Alliances: Balancing and Bandwagoning” in International Politics: Enduring 
Concepts and Contemporary Issues, ed. Robert J.Art and Robert Jervis, (New York: HarperCollins 
Publishers Inc., 1992), 70. 
52 Steven R. David, “Explaining Third World Alignment,” World Politics, vol. 43, no. 3, 
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53 Mearsheimer, 156. 
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24 
the 1950’s may have signaled that the Mongolian alliance with the PRC could be 
devastating. The Soviet attitude toward satellite states was relatively better and 
Mongolia's admission to the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance promised a greater 
position in the alliance.  
In the same way, supporting international institutions can be a balancing strategy 
for small powers. Reducing the return of power restrains a great power’s behavior toward 
a small power. Meanwhile, a small power also enjoys an increasing return of institutions, 
having an equal foothold with the great power and filling the power gap against it.  
The most vital pre-condition for balancing is the availability of an alliance.  A 
buffer state’s security is embedded in two or more powers – it almost never lacks a 
chance to balance one power against another.  Both great powers seek an alliance with a 
buffer state in case a conflict escalates. This pushes the buffer country to choose one 
power over the other, but it can choose with whom it will ally. In other words, a small 
power should make the best choice of the two and give up its interests in exchange for 
security guarantee of a great power. Such an alliance would have an effect similar to 
appeasement. 
Such an alliance can also use a strategy of buck-passing as a way to engage one 
major power against another. Buck-passing is the attempt to “get another state to bear the 
burden of deterring or possibly fighting an aggressor, while it remains on the side-line.”55 
Indeed, the one major power deters the other by assuring the buffer country’s existence 
and promising buck-catching in the case of the other’s invasion. A small power’s external 
balancing attempts to buck-pass its problem to another state; however, it cannot remain 
outside the possible conflict. 
It can be concluded that a small power’s alliance policy also coincides with its 
policy buck-passing.  
2.  Bandwagoning 
Small states choose the bandwagoning strategy under extreme circumstances. 
Bandwagoning, according to Mearsheimer, is joining “forces with its dangerous foe to 
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get at least some small portion of the spoils of war” when there is no “hope of preventing 
the aggressor from gaining power at its expense.”56 It is an “ineffective and dangerous 
strategy.” The bandwagoning state gives up its power and allows the threatening power to 
exploit it.57 
Pre-conditions of bandwagoning include the power disparity between great and 
small states and the absence of a reliable alliance against the aggressor.58 Mongolia’s 
alliance with the Soviet Union against the PRC in the 1960’s is an example of 
bandwagoning. The Soviet Union was overwhelmingly stronger than the PRC and the 
international community, except for the communist camp, had not recognized the PRC as 
a sovereign nation. Under these circumstances, alignment with Moscow provided more 
security advantages for Ulaanbaatar than an alliance with Beijing. An example of 
unsuccessful bandwagoning is the Tibetan policy to surrender to China in 1952. Tibet had 
neither the power to stand against the Chinese military threat nor a reliable ally to defend 
it. Under these conditions, Tibet agreed to give up its sovereignty with the hope that the 
aggressor would respect its national identity, which never happened. 
Not only the absence of an alliance, but also the rivalry of two major powers, can 
eliminate the minor power’s chance of balancing them. Kenneth Waltz explains that “the 
game of power politics, if really played hard, presses the players into two rival camps, 
though so complicated is the business of making and maintaining alliances that the game 
may be played hard enough to produce that result only under the pressure of war.”59 As a 
result of intense pressure from neighboring powers, a buffer state may have no choice 
other than to ally with one against another. Ravdan Bold summarizes two strategies of 
survival of a small power as “entrusting of its security to a stronger power by working an 
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with foreign nations in both the political and military spheres,” where the latter is rarely 
the case.60 Entrusting its security to a major power, or so-called bandwagoning, was the 
most popular strategy during the Cold War. 
Appeasement, an alternative to bandwagoning, is a strategy to avoid. Unlike 
bandwagoning, appeasement attempts to modify the aggressor’s behavior and is based on 
assuaging the aggressor’s feelings of vulnerability. By appeasing and supporting the 
aggressor, a threatened power reduces the aggressor’s fear and tries to avoid direct 
invasion. However, appeasement also relinquishes power and makes the aggressor 
become more powerful at its expense, just like bandwagoning.61  
The reassurance strategy might have the same effect as appeasement, but it 
prevents the aggressor from exploiting the country’s power. Reassurance has the same 
goal of meeting the “adversaries’ needs and weakness” through building confidence and 
reducing uncertainty. Meanwhile, it proposes to establish limits of competition, as 
opposed to direct obedience, as appeasement suggests.62  
3.  Omni-balancing 
Omni-balancing is widely viewed as one of a small power's policy options if it is 
an authoritarian country. When considering omni-balancing, the leader of a small country 
must not only consider the external security environment, but his own domestic political 
risks as well. 
The basic assumptions of this theory can be summarized as follows: the Third 
World countries that enjoy less domestic stability and strong rule usually have an 
authoritarian government. Therefore, the political risk of failing in domestic affairs is 
higher.63  
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It therefore has limits to explaining small, democratic country’s alliance policy. 
Omnibalancing emphasizes the domestic political regime of a small country. In addition, 
great powers may prefer omni-balancing behavior from the leaders of small countries. 
D.  CONDITIONS OF A SMALL POWER BUCKPASSING 
Survival strategy of a small country depends on various external and internal 
factors. Domestic politics and policy making varies from country to country, since 
leaders face different political risks within various political regimes and systems. 
International or regional security situations, such as direct military threat from another 
power or a strong economic dependence on a country, as well as availability of an 
alliance, considerably affect the calculation of a small country’s security policy as well. 
1.  Domestic Political System 
The domestic political regime is one of the important variables of relations 
between asymmetric powers. Whether a regime is democratic or authoritarian determines 
the dynamics of an alliance strategy and a great power’s policy with another country. 
Omni-balancing behavior is expected from leaders of small countries with 
authoritarian political systems. The domestic political cost of authoritarian leaders is 
high. In fact, it could be a matter of life of death, depending on the severity of the 
regime.. To secure the leadership position at the national level, the leaders of 
authoritarian countries ally with foreign powers who guarantee regime stability. A great 
power can easily ensure its interest in a small authoritarian regime simply with allying 
with ruling elites of the country, especially if these elites are unable to effectively control 
their population. 
Such domestic risk is viable in a democratic country; however, it is viable in 
different ways.  Leaders of democratic countries are “punished for policy failure: they are 
forced from office,”64 and opposition parties are more than ready to replace them. A great 
power may ally with a political party or interest group; however, it is difficult to receive 
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popular support to promote the allied party into a leadership position. Yet compared to an 
autocracy, a lobby, party, or other group, can actively engage in political discussions.  
Democracy, therefore, is open to a great power’s influence and more tolerant of 
external pressures and internal interests. Bruce Russet and John Oneal explain that “all 
these (decision-making in matters of peace and war) come from free movement of 
information in liberal democracies, the existence of opposition groups, and the 
accountability of national leaders, which make democracies transparent to outsiders.”65 
Furthermore, democracy is not only transparent in terms of information exchange. 
Existing opposition and lobby groups may also share the rival country’s interests and 
promote them to the political decision-making of the nation.  
2.  Immediate Military Threat 
An immediate military threat is the decisive factor shaping a small country’s 
policy-making. Countries behave differently in peace and war.  
An immediate military threat from a major power is the gravest concern of any 
small country. A study illustrates that a mixed dispute, consiting of a major and small 
power, is the second most likely kind of dispute to escalate, after disputes between two 
major powers. 13.7% of 1017 mixed disputes have escalated into violence.66 Mutual 
military build-ups between hostile countries also increase tension between states, whether 
the conflicting countries are major powers or small powers; however, Susan Sample 
omitted mixed disputes from her analysis of the mutual military build-up effect, believing 
such relations do not exist between asymmetric powers.67  
The possibility of a current crisis escalating into a military conflict requires a 
careful assessment of the adversary’s commitment to use military power. Past Action 
Theory and Current Calculus Theory examine the credibility of such a commitment. Past 
Action Theory examines the history of keeping and breaking commitments to the 
adversary power’s leaders and predicts the possibility of the use of force in a crisis. In 
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contrast, Current Calculus Theory measures the military power and vital interests of the 
aggressor and forecasts the seriousness of threatening behavior. Daryl G. Press tested the 
two theories in four different cases and concluded that Current Calculus was valid. Past 
Action theory requires a careful comparison between cases in “the same part of the 
world, between the same countries, over the same issues and the same level of stakes, and 
involving the same political leaders on both sides.”68  
Russia might then be expected to promise to protect Mongolian independence 
from Chinese invasion, since the Soviet Union did the same thing in 1939 for Japan and 
provided a reliable security guarantee from the hostile PRC during the Cold War. Today, 
Washington’s commitment to defending South Korea seems to be reliable, because U.S. 
troops fought for South Korea against the Northern invasion during the Korean War. 
Press explains that in contrast, “their enemies continued to assess their credibility on the 
basis of the current balance of power and interest – just as Current Calculus Theory 
predicts.”69 Russian military assistance to Mongolia in the case of an external aggression 
would depend on the current balance of power between China and Russia, as well as 
Moscow’s interest in this balance. Similarly defending Taiwan would depend on 
Washington’s interest in Taiwan relative to China. 
Assessing the military balance between great and small powers promises little to a 
small country. A small power is small because it is weak. Efficiency of mobilization, 
structure,70 as well as doctrine and continuity reform may have an impact on military 
power, but it is not sufficient to change the balance. However, any small country may go 
to war against great odds if their vital interests are seriously threatened by great powers. 
For example, Israel fights almost all Arab countries and radical religious extremist 
elements because its very existence is at stake. Vietnam bravely stood against China’s 
invasion in 1979.  Even such small powers may find occasion to engage militarily with a 
much larger neighbor. 
                                                 
68 Daryl G. Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats, (Ithaca, London: 
Cornell University Press, 2005), 147. 
69 Ibid.,148. 
70 Mearsheimer, 79. Mearsheimer determined the efficiency ability to convert national wealth into 
military power. 
30 
3.  Economic Dependency 
A small country’s close economic integration with a great power brings both  
benefits and threats. Realist and liberal views disagree on this point. 
Realist theories view the economic factor as an important means to support a 
state's military. Mearsheimer maintains that “wealth is important because a state cannot 
build a powerful military if it does not have the money and technology to equip, train, 
and continually modernize its fighting forces.”71 However, realists provide no answer to 
how economic interdependence influences the decision-making in the context of a great-
small power dyad.  
Liberal theories address the issue of economic interdependence. The Democratic 
Peace Theory promises a brilliant future for peace with deep economic integration. 
“Higher levels of economically important trade, as indicated by the bilateral trade-to-
GDP ratio,” Russet and Oneal argue, “are associated with fewer incidences of militarized 
international disputes.” This effect was observed regardless of other important factors, 
such as “geographic contiguity, the balance of power, alliance bonds, democracy, and 
economic growth.”72 The trade relationship is more important than war, which could ruin 
mutual benefits. 
Asymmetric trade does not lead to conflict, as Russet and Oneal prove. 
“Economically important trade between large states and small states increases the 
prospects for peace just as it does for states of equal size.” They explain further why this 
is true. “If the small country does not resist the powerful one, there may be no need for 
the latter to exercise its military might.”73 This statement sounds imperialistic for small 
countries. Rather, when they have the option to do so, small powers should recognize and 
avoid relative gains derived from an asymmetric trade under a military threat. 
Taiwan is therefore concerned about China's growing military threat and its 
increasing economic interdependence with China. China’s economic gain literally fattens 
its military budget, which literally invests in military modernization and weapon 
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purchases against Taiwan itself.74 “Deteriorating political relations might cause a state to 
reduce its economic dependence on a potential adversary,” as Russet and Oneal point out, 
“it is much harder for a state to manipulate its total trade-to-GDP ration by restricting 
economic ties with all states simultaneously.”75  
Economic sanctions are viewed as a useful economic tool for punishment in 
foreign policy. Unilateral sanctions, as Meghan L. O’Sullivan notes, are less effective in 
terms of impact, effectiveness, and utility than multilateral sanctions.76 In a buffer state 
scenario, unilateral economic sanctions placed on a small power by a great power can 
force the buffer state to cooperate with other major powers with which the great power 
shares the buffer. A small country that has an ally or another supporter is more difficult to 
sanction.  
Economic sanctions may be effective between rival powers or a small power and 
its ally. Chinese economic sanctions on North Korea would have a devastating impact on 
the target country and could effectively achieve China’s goal. The sanctions would be 
good in terms of utility, having almost no cost, and easily achieve the goal.  Such a 
measure could be more useful than other means of power, such as military. Sanctions 
may be effective if a small country is isolated and has an asymmetric trade relationship 
with a threatening power.  
4.  International Support 
In a dispute against a major power, the availability of international support for the 
small power plays a critical role. The availability of an ally and the ally’s policy towards 
the small country play a decisive role in the behavior of small countries. The alliance 
policy of a small country usually coincides with an attempt of buck-passing, or external 
balancing against the aggressor; however, the country itself cannot remain outside the 
conflict. 
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Hans Mouritzen asserts that a weak power’s basic set of relationships with the 
strong powers in its salient environment determine a small country's behavior.. In the 
case of a dispute between two major powers, small countries can have very different 
strategies. Mouritzen notes the different reactions of Sweden and Finland, both weak 
powers under “the same systemic influences” during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
in 1979. Sweden's policy was to activate the support of Western Europe. Finland took no 
action during this escalation. The difference between these small countries’ reactions can 
be attributed to their respective constellations with major powers established in peace 
time. Sweden had a strong tie with NATO; Finland, in contrast, was a neutral country. 77 
Direct defense partnerships and alliance play an important role in such decision-
making. Small powers are usually willing to join in an alliance if the geopolitical 
environment does not limit such a policy. Eastern European countries, formerly seen as a 
“sanitary zone” between Germany and Russia, joined a military alliance to ensure their 
security throughout the 20th century. For historical reasons, Finland and Austria remained 
neutral in the second half of the 20th century. Japan-U.S. and South Korea-U.S. security 
treaties played an important role during the Cold War and still play the same balancing 
role against China, an emerging regional power. 
Taiwan attempts to buck-pass or balance the PRC based on its close military 
relationship with Washington. Taiwan perceives the U.S.-Taiwan security relationship as 
a possibility for an alliance with the United States in the case of a Chinese invasion. 
Under this assumption, current Taiwanese leaders gradually push U.S. interests toward 
the edge. In a small country’s case, an alliance policy hardly differs from buck-passing. 
The question, therefore, is whether the United States will catch the buck. 
A small country may also decide to unilaterally oppose an aggressor. “If 
grievances in a nearby target are great enough,” Pearson observes, “a country may attack 
and oppose the target government despite power disadvantages.”78 Yugoslavia stood 
alone against NATO-led multinational forces when its leaders considered the nation’s 
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vital interest in Kosovo at stake. Vietnam fearlessly fought China’s intervention even 
though its geographic location isolated it from the main ally. 
E.  CONCLUSION 
As a rational actor in international relations, a small country attempts to maximize 
its interest. The small power with the greatest survival interests will have the greatest 
difficulties because of its inability to influence the current world order and balance of 
power, and its vulnerability to the aggression of great powers. 
Great powers have some constraints on their behavior as well. The world order is 
the primary concern of great powers and a global competition between a status quo power 
and a challenging power requires a lot of resources. International institutions also play an 
important role that limits the actions of great powers under certain circumstances. The 
long-term objective of a great power is a global hegemony, but it cannot achieve this 
objective by breaking down international institutions. 
These constraints of great powers provide room for small powers to survive. Due 
to its limited resources and capacities, a small power cannot achieve its foreign policy 
goals without external resources. A balancing strategy, therefore, coincides with buck-
passing. Bandwagoning, however, can be devastating if it fails. The example of Tibet 
illustrates this.  
The main factors of a small country's decision-making are its political regime and 
its ability to balance external and internal pressure. A great power can easily ensure its 
interest in small countries by allying with their domestic political groups or ruling elites. 
An immediate military threat pushes a small power’s strategy to its limit; however, there 
is no guarantee of changing its position in favor of the great power. Economic 
interdependence is mainly positive for the prosperity of any country, but dependence of a 
small isolated country on one great power can be devastating in strategic terms. A small 
power’s alliance policy shapes its behavior. Indeed, the constellation or close relationship 
with a great power will greatly shape its policy under extreme foreign pressure. 
Balancing or buck-passing coincides with small states’ policy imperatives of 
compensating its weakness through external balancing.  
34 
A small power can maximize its national interest if it is focused on a specific 
limited goal. It can achieve this through the manipulation of the rules of an existing 
international system and the major powers' conflicting interests, balancing one against 
another. However, the main concern remains national security, because security is very 
fragile and cannot withstand any aggressive policy of any great power. 
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III.  TAIWAN: DILEMMA BETWEEN INDEPENDENCE AND 
PEACE 
In the case of 15th Dalai Lama’s reincarnation, Mongolia may find itself in a 
situation very similar to that of Taiwan. Taiwan experiences a dilemma between 
independence, driven by voters’ preferences, and a threat to peace by Chinese military 
invasion. In the same way, Mongolia would find itself caught between a democracy that 
requires its government to be responsive for its people’s religious needs, and a security 
threat due to Beijing’s concern about the Dalai Lama’s influence over Chinese ethnic 
minorities. In both cases, the democracy that holds the government responsive to voters 
also leads these small powers down a collision course with a great power. 
Taiwan is gradually maximizing its independence claim through the manipulation 
of U.S. security interests against China; however, international security concerns prevent 
any radical action. This chapter analyzes two main dynamics of Taiwanese politics--
internal politics and external policies--which would be comparable with Mongolia as a 
democracy and as a small power. This analysis will also address Chinese policies for 
peacefully advancing its interest, using Taiwan’s open and competitive political system. 
A.  DOMESTIC FACTORS 
Although the two countries differ culturally, geopolitically, and economically,, 
they share many common characterists. Both countries are undergoing a transition from 
an authoritarian regime to a democracy. These transitions have brought comparable 
identity issues to both countries. The Taiwanese identity that was oppressed by the KMT 
regime for many years has surfaced in the  political arena and has brought the 
independence claim to the forefront of  politics. The religious identity of Mongolians that 
the communist regime once attempted to liquidate has revived in the society after the 
collapse of the totalitarian regime. Religion is not yet politicized; however, it will surely 
be in case of the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation in Mongolia. Taiwan’s current social and 
political development therefore provide helpful insight.  
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1.  Public and Identity 
The people of Taiwan face a self-identification dilemma of whether they are 
Chinese or Taiwanese, and this division is reflected in voters’ policy preferences. In the 
same way, elements of Mongolian national identity; Buddhist tradition and communist 
legacy, frequently collide in foreign and domestic politics regarding religious issues.  
Many scholars have observed the historical roots of Taiwan's identity since the 
1990’s, when KMT leadership gradually transformed from mainlanders to native 
Taiwanese.  Denny Roy concludes that Taiwan is in a nation-building process. Taiwan is 
an ethnically diversified country and belongs culturally to the general sphere of Chinese 
civilization. However, it has almost never been a part of China politically, nor has it been 
ruled by itself.79 There is much discussion on aboriginal culture, Chinese settlement, and 
Portuguese and Japanese invasion, which have played their respective roles in shaping 
the Taiwanese culture. Despite the common “Chinese” cultural background, the KMT 
was a foreign oppressive regime that suppressed the indigenous culture and language.80 
Taiwan’s democratization since the 1990’s has revived the indigenous people's desire to 
promote its claim to independence.. 
Some U.S. scholars, such as Kerry Dumbaugh, are concerned that the Taiwanese 
identity “may lead to ethnic polarization and political conflict among the population.”81 
Democratization has allowed the indigenous intelligentsia to actively participate in 
politics; however, a growing number of these politicians have radically changed the 
political agenda from unification to independence. This will affect not only mainlanders’ 
interest in Taiwan, but also China’s interest, which considers Taiwan its inseparable 
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territory. Democratization and dramatic change of the political agenda could lead to a 
war. This was a legitimate concern in the late 1990’s and widely discussed by scholars.82 
This concern, however, seems to be unfounded. Democracy finds the exact 
equilibrium among various political interests. Taiwan electorates recently showed less 
support to the radical DPP independence claim, relaxing the tensions of a war and ethnic 
polarization. “Since most people wish to postpone their decision on the 
independence/unification to the future,” Chi Huang explains, “they also tend to be quite 
sensitive to the current and future interaction between Taiwan and China.”83 Indeed, the 
social factor of the Taiwanese identity dilemma has prevented the DPP-led government to 
take radical steps toward  independence. 
The Taiwanese are ready to give up their national identity in exchange for peace. 
“A large percentage of the people in Taiwan can simultaneously agree to unite with 
China, if China becomes modernized and democratic,” Emerson M.S. Niou states, “and 
to declare independence if China will not use force and peace can be maintained.”84 His 
studies reveal that Taiwan’s claim to independence is conditional and depends on 
“China’s military threat, the USA’s security commitment to Taiwan, and China’s 
prospects for becoming democratic and prosperous.”85 The conditional nature of the 
independence claim seems to be common with those of even the youngest generation, 
who hesitate to identify themselves as solely Chinese, and are neutral in politics of 
national independence. “During the past eight years the proportion of Chinese 
identifiers,” G. Andy Chang and T. Y. Wang found, “has dropped substantially for the 
third and fourth generations from 22.6 and 23.1 percent in 1994 to 8.5 and 4.5 percent in 
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2002, respectively.”86 However, they preferred “maintaining the status quo without 
making a commitment to future action,”87 either toward unification or independence. The 
Taiwanese prefer to identify themselves as Taiwanese but are also ready to identify 
themselves as Chinese if China threatens with military power.  The Taiwanese identity 
and independence claim, therefore, still lack the commitment of the population. 
The conditionality of Mongolian religious salience may be comparable with the 
Taiwanese in terms of the Chinese factor. Buddhism in Mongolia has revived after a 70-
year-long communist oppression, and the Dalai Lama has demonstrated genuine religious 
interest by his frequent visits in the last two decades. China has closely observed the 
Dalai Lama’s visits and has politely requested an explanation from the government of 
Mongolia. Because of this, some researchers maintain that the Dalai Lama issue is a risk 
factor in Mongol-Chinese relations.88 China is a conditional factor that should be 
considered in Mongolia’s official policy with the Dalai Lama.  
Compared to Taiwan’s identity problem, Mongolia has two advantages. First, the 
Mongolian national identity is solid and based on nomadic tradition, Lamaist Buddhism 
and East European influences, which partially include a Soviet communist legacy.89 
Second, Mongolia is a homogeneous nation with a small Muslim Kazakh minority 5%,90 
which also shares nomadic traditions. Therefore, the salience of the Lamaist legacy does 
not polarize the political conflict in the country. 
2.  Politics: Identity and Peace 
Taiwan’s self identification dilemma is reflected in its national policies. Political 
parties directly or indirectly advance different national identities, which become the 
platforms of these parties’ policies regarding independence or unification. Analysis of 
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Taiwanese politics and the identity dilemma provide a useful example with which to 
compare Mongolian politics that are likely to advance different arguments in support of 
or in opposition to the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation in the country. 
Taiwan’s independence policy and Taiwan’s identity issue have risen with the 
collapse of the oppressive KMT regime. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 
developed the independence and identity issue as its main platform. The independence 
issue was ambiguous in the early stages of DPP formation.  The Formosa Faction within 
the DPP decided to take a political risk and bring the independence claim to the agenda. 
The 1991 National Assembly election changed the DPP's radical position, and in 1996 
the PRC military threat during Taiwan’s presidential election gradually slowed the 
independence claim to the pragmatic grassroots level. During this same period, 
discussion about military reform and economic strategy began.91 The election of Chen 
Shui-bian to the presidency in 2000 was a turning point for Taiwanese politics. Chen 
Shui-bian was a DPP candidate who promised independence. 
President Chen’s foreign policy since 2000 has been too radical and runs the risk 
of war for his country. As the Culture University poll shows, only 35% of people are 
ready to defend Taiwan and to risk war for independence. The vast majority of 
Taiwanese prefer peace over independence.92 
In contrast to the DPP’s radical independence policy, both the KMT and PFP 
support the peaceful unification of Taiwan with mainland China. However, they do not 
rely directly on the Chinese identity; perhaps because the number of Chinese identifiers 
has significantly decreased in the past decade. A direct advancement of the Chinese 
identity would therefore shrink the parties’ electorates. The KMT promises stability in 
the Taiwan Strait, while still advocating unification, a policy that relies on the Chinese 
identity of Taiwanese. Maintaining the status quo is often equated with peace in Taiwan. 
The status quo also includes the balance of power in the strait, at least according to some 
DPP-leaning analysts. The Pan Blue faction in the Legislative Yuan, comprised of KMT 
and PFP, effectively blocked the Taiwan-U.S. air defense missile trade, which had the 
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potential to affect the military balance in the strait and potentially provoke a war. They 
argue that the purchase could be viewed as a hostile step toward independence, even 
though the purchase of missiles does not necessarily express a declaration of 
independence.93 
The reason for increasing support of the KMT is the electorates’ unrest from the 
DPP's radical competitive policy towards independence, which has a destabilizing effect 
on cross-strait relations. Polls, which were taken after KMT chairman Lien’s trip to the 
PRC, show that 46 percent believed that the KMT was the party most capable of handling 
cross-strait relations, as opposed to only 9.4 percent who believed that the DPP was more 
capable.94 These numbers clearly demonstrate the electorates’ preference of stability in 
the strait, as well as the decreased DPP approval rate. 
The same polarization of political parties may be observed in Mongolia regarding 
the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation in Mongolia. Supporters and opponents of the Dalai Lama 
would likely advance different arguments just as Taiwanese pro-independence and pro-
unification parties do. Supporters of the Dalai Lama argue that the government should be 
responsive to the people’s demands95 and may advance the religious identity of the 
nation. The opponents’ argument is that the national security would be threatened by 
Chinese interests if Ulaanbaatar supported the Dalai Lama,96 thus advancing peace and 
security instead of national identity. Political contest between supporters and opponents 
of the Dalai Lama within the domestic politics of Mongolia would likely resemble those 
of Taiwan.  
China uses Taiwan’s open and pluralist political system to extinguish Taiwan’s 
claim to independence. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cooperates with the KMT 
and the PFP, both of which advance the unification policy. KMT chairman Lien and PFP 
leader James Soong visited China, following an invitation by CCP, and met PRC 
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President Hu Jintao in 2005.97 Hu and Lien agreed to oppose “Taiwan Independence.”98 
Furthermore, the KMT and the CCP agreed to exchange party cadres in order to “boost 
cultural and trade ties across the Straits.”99 
Such cooperation has become a target of criticism by pro-independence groups. 
DPP officials such as Lai I-Chung see the CCP invitation of Pan Blue members as the 
classic example of the “divide and conquer strategy.”100 The KMT was accused of being 
China’s instrument to disrupt domestic Taiwanese politics. 
Cooperation with anti-Dalai Lama parties might be an option for the PRC if the 
Dalai Lama reincarnates in Mongolia, as this case shows. Mongolia is an open and 
pluralist democracy just like Taiwan. Every political party and NGO has the freedom to 
cooperate with any domestic and foreign counterpart in order to pursue its specific 
interests. National sovereignty and borders do little to prevent this cooperation as long as 
the government respects basic human rights and freedom of association.  
B.  EXTERNAL FACTORS 
As small powers, both Mongolia and Taiwan are vulnerable to the policies of and 
therefore have the same strategy of external balancing to maximize their respective 
interests in international politics. Taiwan relies heavily on the United States to counter 
the overwhelming Chinese military threat. Mongolia attempts to reach beyond its two 
neighbors to a “third neighbor,” from its classic sandwiched buffer position. Taiwan’s 
current geo-strategic situation and its strategy provide insight into Mongolia’s status as a 
small power under direct Chinese threat – a situation Ulaanbaatar may encounter if the 
Dalai Lama’s reincarnation takes place in Mongolia.   
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1.  External Military Threat  
Taiwan’s position is more advantageous than Mongolia’s in terms of military 
power, geographic location, and access to assistance from other great powers. It is 
surrounded by a large amount of water, making it difficult to reach from the mainland. It 
also has a powerful economy that can fully support its military expansion. 
A large body of water requires the aggressor to have a power projection capacity. 
Scholars still debate whether the PLA is capable of invading Taiwan. Bates Gill and 
Michael O’Hanlon argue that the Chinese military is not a real threat, because its defense 
budget is not sufficient to achieve its ambitious military reform, and China does not have 
a reliable power projection ability.101 James Lilley and Carl Ford disagree, maintaining 
that the Chinese budget focuses on military modernization, which in fact means that the 
budget is sufficient. Furthermore, China’s “old” logistic system does not necessarily 
equal “bad.” For example, China organized a successful amphibious attack on Parcel 
Island of South Vietnam in 1974.102 
A comparison between a possible amphibious assault in the Taiwan Strait and the 
WWII Normandy operation provides some insight regarding this possibility. Normandy 
was the world’s largest amphibious attack, and a Chinese attack across the Taiwan Strait 
would be quite similar in its geographical scope. However, the correlation of forces 
would be less favorable for the attacking force.103 China has inferior means of 
amphibious transportation, fewer combat aircrafts, and fewer warships than the 
Normandy assault forces in 1945. In contrast, Taiwan has more fighter aircrafts and 
troops to meet the aggressor. Furthermore, Taiwan has about 40 warships patrolling the 
Taiwan Strait, unlike D-day Germany, which had no naval presence. Moreover, China 
would have to obtain air superiority before launching an amphibious attack. Germany had 
no air reconnaissance over Normandy, unlike the Taiwan Strait, over which U.S. 
intelligence satellites fly and control.104 Whether an air, seaborne, or combined assault, 
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there would be no guarantee that China would successfully conquer Taiwan.105  Even if 
the PLA had the same capacity as Allied Forces had in Normandy, it could not be 
guaranteed a victory. 
The key Chinese advantage is its ability to carry out a missile attack. The PLA has 
deployed about 200 missiles in the Taiwan Strait, which target political and economic 
centers; crucial infrastructures, such as oil pipelines, roads, rail and transportation 
networks; major military staging areas; and deployed military formations.106 An 
overwhelming missile attack could not be neutralized even with the two Aegis ships that 
Taiwan has proposed to buy from the United States. O’Hanlon, however, asserts that 
China’s missiles are not accurate enough to destroy the defending force’s vital military 
facilities.107  
China’s military reform is making a tremendous effort to acquire a new 
generation of weapons in order to catch up to advanced nations; however, it lacks the 
conceptual development to wage a large scale amphibious assault. The PLA does not 
have adequate capacity to project enough power to immediately win a war. Reform is 
haphazard and uneven from service to service, which slows down this transition.108 
In response, Taiwan aims to keep its technological advantage and gain a missile 
defense system to counter China. Taiwan’s Armed Forces’ weaponry is a good match 
against the PLA; however, the PLA’s rapid advancement threatens Taiwan’s current 
technological advantage. China’s ballistic missile arsenal challenges the country’s 
defense system.  
Taiwan has enough economic power to successfully accomplish military reform 
and arms modernization to adequately respond to the PRC’s challenge; however such 
reform faces a number of restraints. First of all, Taiwan’s military reform must be self-
sufficient, since the United States is so cautious about arms sales with Taiwan. 
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Washington has rejected Taiwan’s request for the High-speed Anti-Radiation Missiles 
(HARM) and Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) necessary to compensate its 
weakness against China.109 Secondly, military reform in Taiwan has been blocked in the 
Legislative Yuan by the “Pan Blue” faction. It argues that Taiwan’s military reform will 
change the status quo and destabilize the Taiwan Strait. China is less capable of invading 
Taiwan because of its weak power projection capacity; therefore, Taiwan is capable of 
defending itself relatively better than the defenders at Normandy in 1944. Unfortunately, 
China’s rapid military reform, combined with Taiwan’s slow reform, is gradually 
changing the military balance in favor of China. 
Mongolia has two relative disadvantages when compared to Taiwan. First,  unlike 
Taiwan, Mongolia shares a large land border with the PRC, which could be conducive to 
war.110 The scenarios of an air and missile attack also apply to Mongolia, against which 
the Mongolian Armed Forces can do little with their current military capacity. Second, 
Ulaanbaatar lacks the sufficient economic means to catch up to the rapidly modernizing 
PLA.   
Mongolia should learn two lessons from the military development in the Taiwan 
Strait. First, China would not hesitate to threaten the country with military power if it 
finds such action necessary. Ulaanbaatar may face the threat of a Chinese military 
invasion in the case of the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation, Second, anti-Dalai Lama political 
parties may restrain attempts to reform the Mongolian if there is a confrontation between 
Mongolia and China that is similar to that of Taiwan and China.  
2.  Economic Interdependence 
Regardless of their respective levels of economic development, both Mongolia 
and Taiwan are becoming more dependent on the Chinese economy. The negative impact 
that Taipei’s economic interdependence with Beijing has had on Taiwan’s independence 
claim does not bode well for Mongolia and its economic dependence on China should a 
confrontation arise. 
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Cross-strait economic relations are booming and there have been changes in the 
political balance between pro-independence to pro-unification parties. According to the 
Bureau of Foreign Trade, “bilateral trade between Taiwan and China reached US$33.9 
billion” in “the first five months of 2006.” This is “20% of Taiwan’s total foreign trade 
and a 14.3% growth compared to the same period last year.”111 A Taiwan think tank poll 
shows that 50.7% of 1072 respondents support “developing exchanges with the 
mainland,” as opposed to 38.7%, who prefer developing economic relations with other 
countries. Hsu Yung-ming, a researcher of “Academia Sinica,” concludes that "it shows 
Taiwan people have high hopes for cross-Straits relations."112 The KMT asserts that 
President Chen does not pay sufficient attention to the needs of Taiwan’s business 
community, referring to the DPP's restrictions on contact with China.113 The cross-strait 
business interests support the KMT platform to cancel the DPP restrictions and restore 
the three direct links between China and Taiwan. 
Many different political strategies were proposed to regulate cross-strait economic 
relations by pro-independence political leaders for about two decades.  Lee Teng-hui 
declared that the “Go South” policy was not successful enough to divert the Taiwanese 
investment flow to China. “Investment cycles in China, the Southeast Asian financial 
crisis, U.S. economic condition, and economic hardship of Taiwan” are the main factors 
that make such a policy unrealistic. These factors “were important to strategic business 
calculation in the 1990’s and will be into early 2000’s.”114 Considering these realities, no 
such restriction can effectively be implemented. Hsu Hsin-liang, the leader of the 
Formosa Faction of the party, declared a policy under the slogan “Go West Boldly” 
against President Lee’s “Go South” policy.  The intended strategy was to make Taiwan 
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“a bridge between China and the world,” in terms of the economy, and “give both 
Chinese and foreign firms incentives to discourage PRC aggression.”115 The New Tide 
Faction did not accept the “Go West Boldly” slogan and provided the somewhat 
compromised platform, “Strengthen the Base and Go West.” 116 Discussion, however, 
ended with the victory of radical factions and with restriction posed on Taiwanese 
investment in China; however, these restrictions have been gradually relaxed due to harsh 
political critics from opposition parties and business communities. 
Redirecting the economic trend of increasing dependence on China is not a 
realistic option for Mongolia, as the case of Taiwan illustrates. Even with a strong 
economy, Taiwan has achieved little with its “Go South” policy and economic 
restrictions on its investment to China. Seeking opportunities from this rapidly growing 
interdependence, therefore, as become a viable option for Taiwan, which could also be 
useful for poor Mongolia. 
Taiwan may find that cooperation with China has a positive impact on its security. 
For a small power, such cooperation is “the best defense when your rivals are cooperating 
in a multilateral relative gains world,” as Duncan Snidal explains.117 Taiwan gains less 
than China, since investment in China is investment in its national budget. This 
investment eventually goes towards its military, which is dangerous for Taiwan in a 
possible zero-sum competition.  Not cooperating with China, however, may enable China 
to “turn elsewhere and gain even greater relative advantages over Taiwan.”118 “Defensive 
cooperation” with China, therefore, is the best option for Taipei. 
The economic interdependence across the Taiwan Strait may also pose new 
questions about the actual agenda rather than the independence or reunification issues. 
Karen M. Sutter has the same analytical framework as Ming Wan, who analyzed the 
relationship between economic interdependence and regional security, and concluded that 
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interdependence mitigates the conflict and eventually ensures  security.119 The politicians 
will share the same priority of stability in the strait, from which both sides benefit. Such 
interest can already be observed in Taiwan’s domestic politics. The policy of diversion of 
Taiwanese investment from China to Southeast Asia has already failed.120 
Indeed, Taiwanese businessmen find corresponding interests from the PRC 
government. The priority of the third generation of Chinese leaders is domestic economic 
prosperity. They focus on strengthening cross-strait economic interdependence. This 
economic tie is useful for stability of capital investment, and moreover, helpful to 
resolving the cross-strait issue in a peaceful way. Meanwhile, their main concern is the 
current DPP leaders’ policy towards independence, which may lead to war and “delay” 
and “disrupt” the economic development.121 
The political and economic trends diverge, though.122 On the one hand, 
Taiwanese companies have worked out their strategy in the South and to the West, 
despite politics and security concerns. “Some enterprises,” as the Council of Economic 
Planning and Development notes, “are creating a ‘win-win’ situation, as people can take 
advantage of China’s abundant human resources to compensate for the shortage in the 
Southeast Asian countries.”123 On the other hand, since the two countries have joined the 
WTO, little has changed. The positive political prognoses for the two countires with 
regard to WTO membership has not become a reality. The membership has put no end to 
the DPP proposed investment restriction on the PRC, which would promote deeper 
integration, as Ping Deng predicted.124 As Sutter found out from conversations with 
academics from Taiwan’s Institute of International Relations, Taiwan would have 
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continued its restrictions, and Beijing would not have raised a trade dispute against Taipei 
“in a multilateral setting.”125  Even the WTO memberships of the two countries and their 
deepening economic interdependence could not provide incentives for resolving political 
issues. 
Sino-Taiwanese economic interdependence enhances unification rather than 
independence, and it provides no political rapprochement. This provides two lessons for 
Mongolia. First, the failed “Go South” policy illustrates that redirection of economic 
interdependence is not an option for Mongolia. Indeed, no mighty economic power that 
can unilaterally balance the Chinese economic expansion has been seen in Taiwan’s case. 
Second, Mongolia should take advantage of its increasing economic dependence on 
China, as the strategies for Taiwan have recommended. The economic importance of 
Mongolia might change PRC’s coercive policy if the countries found themselves in 
political confrontation.  
3.  International Support 
External balancing of Taiwan is specific to its unique situation. Two factors make 
Taiwan different from Mongolia in terms of foreign policy: Taiwan is not a sovereign 
country and Taiwan is loosing its buffer status. These differences dictate the specifics of 
Taiwan’s policy for international support for its independence through external 
balancing. A careful look at the U.S. attitude towards Taiwan  reveals what action 
Ulaanbaatar should take. 
Taiwan is not a sovereign nation recognized by the wider international 
community, but U.S. military assistance guarantees its status quo. Taipei, therefore, 
heavily relies on U.S. support. In the same way, it pursues its claim of independence by 
counting on U.S. military assistance even though Washington hesitates to support the 
claim. This is seen as “pressing for a unilateral change in the status quo,”126 which 
requires the United States to risk war. The U.S. goal in the region is not defending 
Taiwan, but ensuring peace and preventing war. Washington has complex interests in 
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both China and Taiwan and does not want to give up one for the other. It will 
simultaneously lose all of its interests in both sides if a war starts in the Taiwan Strait. To 
pacify both sides, Washington proposes that “Taiwan should not be moving towards 
independence; and mainland China should not be moving towards the use of force or 
coercion.”127 The United States believes it can prevent a war and maintain its interests if 
it remains tied to both sides. 
Taipei’s radical steps towards independence have gradually pushed the United 
States against China. This push has been a target of harsh U.S. criticism. Michael D. 
Swain blames Taiwan’s leaders for destabilizing regional security and risking U.S.-China 
relations. He criticizes the pro-Taiwan arguments in the U.S. Congress and argues that 
there is no reason to support Taiwan’s independence. Self-determination of any people is 
not sufficient for independence, as is evident in the cases of Chechnya, Kashmir, Kosovo 
and Tibet--and Taiwan is no exception to this.  “At the present, the most immediate threat 
to such (U.S. deterrence of China not to use force) a policy is presented by the actions of 
President Chen,”128 he concludes.  The question is whether U.S. interest in Taiwan is 
worth defending. 
Taiwanese interest for independence mismatches U.S. interest in the region; 
therefore, Taipei’s slow pressing on the United States causes Washington to resume its 
relative power and reconsider its strategy in the region to ensure peace and prevent war. 
Mongolia should be cautious about relying on a single great power to advance its interest, 
and it should thoroughly consider the goals and interests of great powers that support it. 
Otherwise, the country could easily lose its support.  
Although the United States is a single superpower in the world, it has its relative 
limits as well. Whether Washington can deter China is debatable. Ross is very confident 
that Washington can easily deter China for “many decades.”129 With regard to both 
countries’ nuclear and conventional armament and technological capacities, Washington 
can easily deter Beijing from taking an aggressive step. Christensen, however, disagrees.. 
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He points out the deficiencies of understanding “a peer competitor.” In terms of global 
deployment of its forces and technological state of art, China does match the United 
States; however, it will challenge Washington anywhere, if it perceives a threat.130 It can 
easily take advantage of its proximity, concentration of conventional forces and human 
casualty acceptance character. The United States, however, has its forces distributed 
throughout the world and is sensitive to casualties. 
Washington is concerned about the U.S. strategy for achieving stability in the 
Taiwan Strait. Strategic ambiguity, such as the Janus-Faced Foe type of pivotal 
deterrence, where “each adversary will be deterred if (and only if) it thinks that the pivot 
will align against it,”131 currently prevents Beijing from going to war, because the United 
States would defend Taiwan. Taiwan’s current radical policy towards independence, on 
the one hand, challenges the strategic ambiguity. The downfall of this strategy is that it 
could “encourage the two sides to take risks” and “blunder into war.”132 Indeed, 
Taiwan’s miscalculation of U.S. alignment or misunderstanding of its message by both 
sides could lead to war. On other hand, a strategic clarity policy “will invite from both 
sides the maximum degree of pressure and political maneuvering possible, within those 
thresholds.” 133  
Taipei’s reliance on Washington and Taiwan’s pressure on the United States 
provides  Mongolia with an example of what it should and should not do. First, Mongolia 
should not rely on a single great power. Taiwan is not a sovereign country and this 
disadvantage certainly limits its political allies and causes it to rely heavily on the United 
States. A negative side of this reliance is that it limits Taipei’s options of manipulation 
and locks it into a triangular Sino-U.S.-Taiwan relationship. Mongolia, an independent 
and sovereign nation, has more options than Taiwan. Ulaanbaatar’s “third neighbor” 
policy increases the number of allies and extends its cooperation beyond its neighbors. 
Second, Mongolia’s policy should be consistent. Taiwanese claim to independence seems 
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to be an unilateral change of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait that challenges its ally’s 
strategy. Because of Taiwan’s changing policy, the United States had to reconsider its 
capacity and strategy. Washington’s refusal to sell Taiwan HARM and JDAM missile 
defense systems is another example of U.S. policy to maintain strategic ambiguity and 
discourage current Taiwanese leaders. Mongolia’s support of the reincarnated Dalai 
Lama should not be treated as a sudden change of its policy if the country pursues its 
current commitment to democracy, human rights and freedom, and active international 
participation. 
C.  CONCLUSION 
The case of Taiwan provides useful insight for Mongolia regarding the possible 
development of internal and external factors if Ulaanbaatar finds itself threatened by 
China.. Taiwan is an example of a small democratic power that tries to maximize its 
interest by manipulating the interests of great powers. 
The threat of China plays a conditional role in voters’ preferences regarding 
Taiwanese independence policy, which would likely be the same for Mongolia’s 
decisions on whether to support the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation. Today’s Taiwanese 
domestic politics, in which different parties advance different identities for different 
cause, may likely be replayed in Mongolia.  
Ulaanbaatar can do little single-handedly about the military and economic balance 
with China. Taiwan fares relatively better in terms of its geo-strategic location and 
economic development, which should strengthen its main advantage of international 
recognition. Its status as a buffer state may shelter it from direct military and economic 
threats.  
The PRC uses a two-fold policy with Taiwan in order to pursue its interests. 
Externally, it threatens Taiwan with a military invasion and commitment to war. U.S. 
reluctance to support the Taiwanese independence claim and military modernization 
leave Taiwan no choice but to abandon its claim, if not go to war. The growing economic 
power of China enables it to integrate Taiwan’s economy deeper into its own, gaining 
more than Taiwan does from the relationship. Such asymmetric gains provide China an 
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opportunity to slowly advance over Taiwan and unify Taiwan, which is its ultimate goal. 
Internally, China cooperates with anti-independence opposition parties to isolate the pro-
independence ruling party. The anti-independence and pro-cooperation platform of the 
KMT offers electorates security, stability and economic growth, as opposed to the DPP 
leaders, who run the risk leading their country to war. It is again China who gains more in 
these internal political dynamics than the Taiwanese independence movement. 
China could likely pursue such a two-fold policy with Mongolia in the case of the 
Dalai Lama’s reincarnation. However, Ulaanbaatar has advantages, such as Mongolia’s 
sovereignty and independence, and its status as a buffer state, which could risk Beijing’s 
relations with Russia and other countries. 
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IV.  DILEMMA BETWEEN DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY 
As a small power, Mongolia is vulnerable to the policy of larger powers.  It must 
struggle with its geo-strategic position between the two great powers on its borders, 
Russia and China.  Mongolia's search for a "third neighbor" reflects its ambition to 
maximize its national interests by balancing a powerful virtual "third" against these two 
actual neighbors. Even in the context of such a strategy, such maximization cannot 
fundamentally contract the actual neighbors' interests.  While many of these interests are 
geo-political, and thus subject to the power politics factors discussed in a previous 
chapter, other interests of Russia, China, and Mongolia stem from unique domestic and 
political contexts.  This chapter will explore the role of religious identity in the power 
politics of Mongolia as it faces its large neighbor to the South. 
Buddhism is deeply ingrained in Mongolian political culture today.  This chapter 
will begin by describing the role of Buddhism in modern Ulaanbaatar politics. This 
religious identity can lead to deeply rooted conflict with the secular regime in Beijing, 
particularly if something heightens the salience of Buddhist identity in Mongolia.  In 
order to consider this phenomenon, this chapter will also consider the case of a 
hypothetical reincarnation of the next Dalai Lama in Mongolia.134 In the context of such 
an increased political salience of Buddhism, Ulaanbaatar will face a new dilemma of 
meeting the religious needs of its people and countering the threat from China. In such a 
case, international support—the third neighbor and others—will play a decisive role. 
This chapter first analyzes domestic factors. The main variables that determine 
this small country’s policy are the degree to which Mongolians are religious and how 
politicians view the possible reincarnation of the Dalai Lama. The 9th Jebtsundamba’s 
visit to the country in 1999 provides an example of how these politics may develop in 
regard to the reincarnation scenario. Bogd Jebtsundamba Khan was the dual head of 
religion and state of the Bogd Khan Kingdom of Mongolia from 1911 to 1924, just as the 
Dalai Lama is for Tibet. 
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To understand the implications of such a religious revival, one must also examine 
the perceptions and likely interests of outside players.  Thus, issues such as military 
threats from China and economic dependence on China will also be considered. The 
country is not only a buffer state between Russia and China, but also a part of buffer 
culture between India and China. The second section will discuss the policies of these 
countries, along with U.S. policies. 
A.  DOMESTIC FACTORS 
A Buddhist resurgence has affected national policy persistently since Mongolia 
has become a democracy. Every time the Dalai Lama visits Mongolia, Ulaanbaatar 
explains that the government still recognizes Tibet as an integral part of the PRC, that the 
Dalai Lama's visit has nothing to do with politics, and that it is only a function of 
religious affairs, since Mongolia is a Lamaist country. In the case of a more extreme 
event, such as the 15th Dalai Lama's reincarnation in Mongolia, China would not likely 
be satisfied with this kind of explanation. 
The following section examines three main aspects of the role of religion in the 
politics of Mongolia. The first section compares the 9th Jebtsundamba’s visit to the 
possible political scenario of the Dalai Lama’s future reincarnation in Mongolia. The next 
section looks at the relationship between Buddhism in Mongolian society and national 
identity. The final section examines political arguments of the supporters and opponents 
of the next Dalai Lama’s reincarnation in Mongolia. 
1.  9th Jebtsundamba’s Visit to Mongolia in 1999 
Ninth Jetsun Dampa Jambal Namdol Choikya Gyaltsen is the 9th reincarnation of 
Jebtsundamba Rinpoche, whose 8th reincarnation was Bogd Khan of the Kingdom of 
Mongolia from 1911 to 1924. His only visit to Mongolia in 1999 triggered some minor 
tensions with the government of Mongolia. This tension and the consequent international 
effects are instructive for such events in the future. 
There are some significant differences between the Jebtsundamba and the Dalai 
Lama. Jebtsundamba was a king of Mongolia, but his current reincarnation enjoys 
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relatively less legitimacy and draws some suspicion. The Dalai Lama enjoys popular 
legitimacy in Mongolia, but was king of Mongolia,  
There are also similarities between Jebtsundamba and the Dalai Lama.. Both are 
reincarnated monks and head of a national religion. Emperors of the Qing Dynasty 
historically treated them as equal. The previous incarnation of the Jebtsundamba led 
Mongolia toward independence together with the previous incarnation of the Dalai Lama, 
whose current incarnation struggles. It is necessary to examine the current Chinese 
pressure on the Mongolian government and the various domestic interest groups in order 
to predict the possible political developments in Mongolia in the case of the Dalai Lama’s 
reincarnation. 
a.  Lamas, Officials and Politics 
Jebtsundamba’s visit to Mongolia was a result of eight years of persistence 
on the part of believers. The geo-strategic environment of the early 1990’s determined  
Mongolia’s policy with the 9th Jebtsundamba. The government of Mongolia refused to 
issue a visa for the 9th Jebtsundamba in early 1991, when he was recognized by the Dalai 
Lama as the 10th reincarnation of Jebtsundamba lineage. The intent was to avoid harming 
the warming Mongol-Chinese relations following the exchange of visits of the two heads 
of states - Mr. Punsalmaa Ochirbat’s visit in 1990 and Mr. Yang Shangkun’s visit in 
1991.135 Mongolia’s geo-strategic situation was not good in those days: it had been 
drafting its new constitution towards democracy since late 1989; the Soviet Union had 
collapsed with its security guarantee and withdrawn its troops; and the PRC had 
demonstrated its intolerance with democracy in 1989 at Tiananmen Square. At this 
critical moment, inviting the previous religious king may have had serious security 
implications. 
At the time, the Buddhist resurgence was strong and a number of people 
represented such religious interests. The Center of Mongolian Buddhists, an NGO, was 
comprised of politicians, including Mr. O. Dashbalbar, leader of United Traditional 
Party; Mr. Ninj, an active leader of the Democratic Union; and other activists. They 
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lobbied for the authority to invite the 9th Jebtsundamba to Mongolia.136 The Center 
officially requested a visa for the 9th Jebtsundamba several times. Yo Amgalan, Deputy 
Abbot of the Gandantegchilin Monastery, said “we have received no response.”137 
The religious lobby was finally able to welcome the Jebtsundamba to 
Mongolia. He had allegedly obtained a visa from the Mongolian Consulate in Elstei, 
Republic of Khalmik, Russia, which was awaiting parliamentary approval for its opening. 
New Councilor Budbazar issued the visa under the name of Jambal, the given name of 
the actual person of 9th Jebtsundamba’s reincarnation.138 
His arrival in Mongolia accidentally coincided with President Jiang 
Zemin’s official three-day visit to Mongolia.139 Just after Jiang’s departure, 
Jebtsundamba had announced his visit to Mongolia. Abbots of monasteries enthroned 
him to Head of Mongolian Lamaism at the Erdenezuu monastery in Karakorum, a town 
that had been the capital of the Mongol Empire.140  
As Head of Mongolian Lamaism, the Jebtsundamba founded the Religious 
Assembly, which consisted of heads of monasteries supporting him for accession. He  
established the Religious Administration, which consisted of seven Ministers and a body 
that has an executive power in temporal affairs. Ministers included both religious and 
non-religious figures, one of whom was Mr. Budbazar, the diplomat who had issued him 
the visa. Ninj, a leader of one of the small factions of the Democratic Union, required the 
government to grant Mongolian citizenship to Jebtsundamba. 141 
This action threatened the secular government of Mongolia, as some 
officials and analysts had predicted, and the government enforced the 1995 National 
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Security Council Resolution to expel Jebtsundamba from the country. “The government 
was on the edge of being overthrown,” Professor Bayarkhuu explains.142 Jebtsundamba 
has seemingly attemtped to overthrow the national government and re-establish a 
theocracy, claiming the throne of Mongolian Khan, which had been his legitimate status 
in his previous life. The Religious Assembly and the Religious Administration resembled 
an establishment of a parallel structure with government power. The Religious 
Administration was modeled after the Tibetan government-in-exile.143 
The accidental timing of Jebtsundamba’s visit during Jiang Zemin’s visit 
doubled the security concern. The “Chinese thought it had been organized specially and 
demanded that he be sent back within 24 hours,” Samdan Tsedendamba said in a Forum 
18 interview. 144 The Mongolian government insisted that Jebtsundamba had a tourist 
visa and had traveled by private capacity “just like any tourist.”145  
Government officials, especially the National Security Council and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, played primary roles in resisting him and expelling him back 
to India, where he currently resides. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs refused to issue a 
Mongolian visa to the 9th Jebtsundamba, apparently in accordance with the National 
Security Council’s secret resolution of 1995. This resolution was allegedly initiated by 
the Minister of Culture and supported by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the National 
Security Council, consisting of the President, the Prime Minister and the Speaker of 
Parliament.146 The National Security Council and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs took an 
initiative.  Jebtsundamba Rinpoche eventually gave up and returned back to India.147 
The media and politicians felt less threatened by Jebtsundamba. The 
media covered his visit in a relatively low-key manner. Politicians considered the visit of 
little significance compared it to the political competitions of the days. Members of  
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parliament were focused on a government cabinet resignation, and not on a reincarnated 
monk’s visit.148 Scholars and researchers weren’t aware of the contemporary 
developments in Karakorum.149 
Expelling Jebtsundamba was not a covert operation led by the security and 
diplomatic services, since heads of all important monasteries were involved and 
appointed to the important positions of the Religious Assembly and Administration. The 
lack of attention may have been due to other political developments at the time. The year 
of 1998 was a turbulent year in Mongolian politics; it included two government cabinet 
resignations and the very first assassination, which was allegedly political. Furthermore, 
the media was focusing on the recent visit of Jiang Zhemin and the Prime Minister’s 
corruption scandal, which later led to the resignation of his cabinet.150 
b.  Observation and Implication in Dalai Lama Scenario 
This case reveals two interesting points that are relevant to the possible 
15th  Dalai Lama’s reincarnation: the position of Mongolia with regard to religious heads 
of Lamaism and the 9th Jebtsundamba’s political ambitions, which the opposition assume 
to be the Dalai Lama’s. 
On the one hand, politicians and officials were not responsive to the 
people’s religious needs as a democratic government should be if the support was so 
significant. Samdan Tsedendamba concluded that “we learnt that Mongolians were much 
closer to the issue of Bogdo Gegen (Jebtsundamba) than we thought.”151 The government 
of Mongolia partially violated the constitutional principle of respecting religion. A 
government should respect the basic human rights and freedom of belief. Election of the 
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supreme religious leader by the heads of monasteries is not a government business and 
the elected religious leader should be accepted by the government.  
The officials were extremely suspicious of Jebtsundamba’s activities 
regarding the Religious Administration.  Once the Jebtsundamba was officially 
recognized by heads of monasteries as a Head of Religion, the establishment of the 
Religious Assembly and Administration was necessary to administer the religious affairs; 
this fact cannot be explained solely as a challenge for the legitimate government of 
Mongolia. Staff and bureaucracy are fundamental to an effective administration. The 
Bogd Khan 8th Jebtsundamba was indeed the head of two different parallel 
administrations - Government of Cabinet, a secular administration in charge of national 
policy, and Erdeneshanzudov Cabinet, a religious administration in charge of religious 
affairs. Samdan Tsedendamba explains that in 1921, the 8th Jebtsundamba’s political 
power was completely delegated to civilian politicians, and he retained his absolute 
power only in religious affairs.152  
On the one hand, there are some valid arguments against the 9th 
Jebtsundamba’s political ambitions. He and his political and religious allies made 
persistent efforts to visit Mongolia, which showed his vested interest in Mongolia, 
whether it was political or purely religious. His acquisition of a visa demonstrated that 
the Jebtsundamba’s supporters were strong and active. 
The government of Mongolia and Tibetan government-in-exile have 
different views of the Dalai Lama’s role in Jebtsundamba’s visit. Batbayar called 
Jebtsundamba’s visit a “plot of the Dalai Lama”153 and Bayarkhuu pointed out that “the 
Dalai Lama called the Jebtsundamba Rinpoche, blaming him for his arbitrary actions and 
demanding that he apologize to the government of Mongolia.”154 In contrast, Tashi 
Wangdi,  who was representative of His Holiness Dalai Lama at the time, maintains that 
the Dalai Lama “had nothing to do with the visit and we did not know that he 
(Jebtsundamba) was there until it was brought to our attention.” He explains, “we also 
made it very clear that we had no influence over him. The question of His Holiness                                                  
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calling him back, therefore, does not arise.”155 Regarding the Dalai Lama’s call, he 
explains, “we (Embassy of Mongolia and the representatives of the Dalai Lama) had 
agreed to pass a request to him (Jebtsundamba) to reconsider his decision to extend his 
stay in Mongolia.”156  
These contradictory comments illustrate how both sides were sensitive to 
this issue. The Dalai Lama’s interference in Mongolian domestic politics is doubtful, 
because he enjoys the most respect in Mongolia and it it would definitely harm his 
reputation. Mongolian officials may have had two reasons for blaming the Dalai Lama 
for the Jebtsundamba’s visit. First, it may have been a way to show Mongolia’s 
“innocence” to Chinese officials.. The Jebtsundamba’s sudden visit risked Mongol-
Chinese relations during the Jiang Zemin’s visit, which was the result of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs’ long-term efforts. Second, it may have been a preventive strategy to 
discourage similar actions that could take place in the future.  
With regard to the possible reincarnation of the next Dalai Lama, the 
Jebtsundamba’s visit illustrates a political competition between the religious 
sympathizers and rational security concerns. Monasteries and other interest groups would 
likely support the reincarnated Dalai Lama as they did in the case of the Jebtsundamba, 
and government officials would be very sensitive to the reincarnation. Unlike the case of 
Jebtsundamba, the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation in Mongolia would raise a wider political 
discussion and the political parties would likely be regrouped and allied with their 
respective interest groups.  The Jebtsundamba’s visit clearly demonstrates possible 
political developments in Mongolia in the case of the reincarnation of the next Dalai 
Lama. 
2.  How Religious is Mongolia? 
If a religious crisis between Mongolia and China escalated the to level of "you are 
with us or against us," Mongolia would have only two options -- ally with China against 
the Dalai Lama or counter China with the Dalai Lama. The outcome would depend on  
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how religious Mongolians are and Mongolians’ attitude towards Buddhism. Because of 
the scarcity of statistical data, it is important to examine the relationship between national 
identity and religion. 
Mongolia has different cultural heritages determined by religion, ways of life, and 
historical legacy. Current Mongolian national identity has been shaped by Central Asian 
nomadic traditions, East Asian Buddhist civilization, and the Proletarian Internationalism 
model of Soviet and East European culture. Munkh-Ochir Dorjjugder identifies an 
identity problem, explaining, "As a nation, Mongolia faces the identity trilemma and 
security dilemma, without much preference given to any of these options during the last 
decade."157 
The main influences of the nation’s policy with regard to the Buddhist revival 
issue are the atheist culture derived from Communism and the nation’s Buddhist heritage. 
If communist atheism were to prevail, Mongolia would join China against the Dalai 
Lama. If Buddhist heritage prevailed, Mongolia would support the Dalai Lama and 
withstand China. 
a.  Communist Atheist Culture 
Atheism, is one of the integral parts of communist ideology, which ruled 
Mongolia for seventy years and had both positive and negative impacts. The negative 
impacts were apocalyptic for the Buddhist nature of the nation. The positive impacts, 
however, have driven Mongolia into the modern age.  
Communism destroyed religion, and settlements emerged around the 
monasteries. Settled life was a “result of the conversion of the Mongols to Tibetan-style 
Buddhism.”158 During the Stalinist holocaust from 1937 to 1938, “more than twenty 
thousand persons were killed,”159 the vast majority of which were monks, without any 
judicial proceedings. This was about 10% of the male population; assuming that half of 
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the population of 500,000 was male..160 Eight hundred monasteries existed before 1921; 
all of them were destroyed. The ultimate goal of this destruction was to eliminate old 
feudal remnants and to lay down the ground for a new communist culture.161 
This ideology continued to brainwash society for seventy years. New 
communist intellectuals emerged from the ruins of old tradition. They asserted that 
Buddhism was outdated and that it was the reason for Mongolian underdevelopment. 
Alan Sanders noted in 1966 that “there are now very few believers, and the last lamas in 
the country are now concentrated at Gandan in Ulan Bator,” referring to a mere 82 lamas 
in 1966.162 
Mongolia’s communist heritage did not have solely negative outcomes. 
Communism was the driving force of Mongolian modernization and led to its identity of 
"East European-ness." Munk-Ochir writes that "close ties with the most liberal-minded 
Communist nations, such as Poland, (former) Czechoslovakia and Hungary may have 
been a part of the Soviet strategy of driving Mongolia apart from its cultural heritage, but 
nonetheless the impact benefited Mongolia when it became the only Asian Communist 
nation to go through a peaceful revolution toward democracy."163 
b.  Deep Buddhist Culture 
Despite the communist destruction and murder, Buddhism remained alive 
among the population. As Munkh-Ochir explains, Mongolia was never a theocracy like 
Tibet. Although the head of the nation of Bogd Khan Kingdom of Mongolia was a monk, 
the public and religious administrations were separate. Aristocracies ran local and 
government administrations. Many of the highest titles were given to military and 
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under the King; however, it was never mixed with public administration. Some individual 
monks were appointed to government positions, but they acted strictly as government 
officials, not religious officials.164 
The highest monks cooperated with the communist government and 
sometimes became a tool of their policy. In 1950’s, Mongolia restored two Buddhist 
monasteries to display communist respect of the basic human right of belief and practice 
of religion in order to join the United Nations. The World Buddhist Peace Conference 
was held in Ulaanbaatar in an effort to support the Soviet Union against the PRC. The 
conference blamed China for human rights violation in the early 1970’s and discussed the 
Dalai Lama issue.165 The communist government essentially used Buddhism for its own 
narrow purpose. Regardless of this goal, however, its efforts helped save Mongolian 
Buddhism.166 
Religion was revived following the collapse of the communist regime; 
however, Buddhism could not regain the previous social significance that it had enjoyed 
in the early 20th century. The religion is still weak and in its infancy to some extent. Ajaa 
gegeen, an Inner Mongolian reincarnated Rinpoche, who fled from China in response to 
the Panchen Lama’s reincarnation dispute, finds a growing gap between society and 
religion in Mongolia. The reason for such a gap is that seventy years of communist rule 
has alienated people from their traditional religion. “People are keeping pace with 
modernization,” Rinpoche says, “however, the religion remains the same as it was in 
early 20th century.” Lamaism in Mongolia should renew itself to meet the religious needs 
of the population, as Buddhism has done in other countries, such as Thailand, Korea, 
Japan and China. Current Mongolian religious leaders are thriving in religious education, 
but are weak in such areas as renovation and administering the monks.167  
                                                 
164 Munkh-Ochir Dorjjugder (Lead researcher, the Institute for Strategic Studies) in discussion with 
the author, January 2007,The Institute for Strategic Studies, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. 
165 Rupin, 12. 
166 Ravdan Bold, (Ambassador of Mongolia to the United States) in discussion with the author, March 
12, 2007, Embassy of Mongolia in the United States. Mr. Ravdan Bold was secretary of the National 
Security Council of Mongolia from 1997 to 2002. He is a prominent scholar in the security affairs and a 
founding scholar of the Institute for Strategic Studies. 
167 Ajaa Rinpoche (Rinpoche) in discussion with the author, February 27, 2007, Rinpoche’s residence 
in Mill Valley, California. 
64 
Professor Shurkhuu finds the revival of Buddhism in Mongolia since the 
early 1990’s healthy. Lamaism in Mongolia is still strong in the spiritual and habitual 
spheres; however, it is weak in terms of keeping the modern pace. This is quite 
acceptable compared to the early 20th century’s fanatic superstition of a medieval 
form.168 
3.  How do Political Interest Groups Differ? 
In order to examine the potential for a catalytic event that would change the 
political and religious landscape in Ulaanbaatar, the author conducted a number of 
interviews with leading political leaders, government officials and scholars about a 
hypothetical reincarnation of 15th Dalai Lama in Mongolia.  These interviews revealed 
that the policy-makers’ opinions are already divided into two camps with regard to such 
an event. Supporters refer to democratic principles of government responsiveness and 
welcome the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama for reasons pertaining to national identity. 
Opponents cite the conditionality of the Chinese factor and concerns over national 
security, similar to anti-independence parties arguments in Taiwan. Moreover, CCP has 
already begun to cooperate with major Mongolian political parties, such as the 
Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party, the Mongolian Democratic Party and the Civil 
Will Party, as it already does with the KMT and the PFP in Taiwan.169 
a.  Supporters 
The supporters applaud the Dalai Lama’s possible reincarnation in 
Mongolia, but have different reasons. 
The principles of a democratic government, such as respect for the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of its citizens and responsiveness to the people's 
political demands, play an important role in religious affairs. Bat-Uuel, a member of 
Parliament and an active leader of the Democratic Party of Mongolia, strongly believes 
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this. Above all, Mongolia is an independent country. Regardless of how other countries – 
even a powerful one like China -- feel about it, the government of Mongolia should be 
Mongolian. Secondly, the government of Mongolia should respect human rights. The 
reincarnation is a religious matter and politics have nothing to do with it. The right to 
believe and practice religion is a human rights issue as well. Thirdly, as a democracy, the 
Mongolian government should be responsive to the people's choice. If people appreciate 
Lamaism as a part of their national identity and support the Dalai Lama or any other 
reincarnated monks, the government should protect the Dalai Lama regardless of China's 
threat.170 
The Dalai Lama issue provides the country with some unique 
opportunities in security and foreign policy. Mrs. Hulan Hashbat, a former member of 
parliament, maintains that the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama would have at least two 
positive impacts on Mongolia. The domestic impact of this would be the elimination of 
the old outdated nomadic image of Mongolia and the reemphasis of the Buddhist 
character of Mongolian civilization. Mongolia could potentially become a center of 
Mahayana Buddhism, which would attract tourists and be profitable for its economy. This 
would actively promote "security of Mongolian civilization," one sector of the 
comprehensive security concept of Mongolia. She emphasizes the importance of securing 
Mongolian civilization in the emerging Sino-centric East Asian regionalism. The 
international impact would be the increased importance of Mongolia in other great 
powers' politics with China. Russia-China and U.S. – China relationships will be 
competitive in the future because these countries see each other as strategic competitors. 
In this regard, the Dalai Lama would help Mongolia to attract the attention of other great 
powers.171  
b.  Opponents 
The main argument of the opposition is related to national security. 
Recognition of the 15th Dalai Lama, Professor Batbayar Tsedendamba concludes, would 
drive Mongolia onto a collision course with China’s security policy. This would 
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disregard the fundamental foreign policy principles of good neighbor relationships with 
Russia and China.172  The concept of foreign policy gives the foremost priority to the 
Mongolian relationship with its immediate neighbors for “all-round good neighborly 
cooperation.”173 
Bayarkhuu Dashdorj says that Mongolia should learn from its historical 
experience . A religious war in Tibet and the 5th Dalai Lama’s policy of leading the 
Mongolian military into Tibetan domestic policy in the 17th century led to political 
instability, which resulted in Mongolia joining the Qing Dynasty. History repeats itself, 
he states, describing the similarity of today’s situation. The Dalai Lama runs out of 
options; he surrenders the Tibetan Independence policy and looks for normalizing his 
relationship with China. China warns Mongolia very politely; closing the railroad in 
2002, and suspending a high ranking visit in 2006.  In this circumstance, Mongolia gains 
nothing but failure if it supports the Dalai Lama.174 
As a small country, Mongolia should be cautious of its relations with great 
powers, Professor Shurkhuu of the Scientific Secretary of the Institute of International 
Studies asserts.  He warns that India could be interested in the reincarnation of the Dalai 
Lama in Mongolia. The Dalai Lama issue is one of the current problems in Indo-Chinese 
relations. Dehli seeks a good relationship with China and wants to have its share of 
development of Chinese western regions. The reincarnation of the Dalai Lama in 
Mongolia would liberate India from a problem with China and provide a good 
opportunity to keep its leverage against China in Mongolia.. India intends to play  
Mongolia against China, just as China does Pakistan against India.175 
China, as Professor Shurkhuu surmises, might also be interested the Dalai 
Lama’s reincarnation in Mongolia.  Mongolia would rapidly become dependent on China 
and would be unable to pose a military threat in any way. A dependent Mongolia would 
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provide more opportunity to control the Dalai Lama in the case of his reincarnation in the 
country than anywhere else, especially in India.176  
B.  EXTERNAL FACTORS 
Many external factors would affect Mongolia’s policy as a small power. In the 
event of the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama, a variation in these factors would directly 
shape Ulaanbaatar’s strategy.  
The first section will explain why the reincarnation is a potential, indeed realistic, 
problem in light of the Panchen Lama’s case (which suggests two reincarnations of the 
Dalai Lama).  The Dalai Lama and his officials debate a strategy to avoid this possible 
controversy, in which the reincarnation in Mongolia is not ruled out. The next section 
evaluates the military parameters of Mongolian self-defense and the limits of Chinese 
capabilities for direct invasion. The third section assesses Mongolia’s dependence on the 
growing Chinese economy. The final section discusses the international environment that 
could affect Chinese influence.  
1.  Reincarnation and Politics 
The South China Morning Post, a Hong Kong newspaper, reported that Tao 
Changsong, who is the deputy director of Tibetan Contemporary Research Center in 
Lhasa, proclaimed that the next Dalai Lama will not be found among “foreigners.” In 
response, the Dalai Lama announced that he will be reborn in a “free” country out of 
China’s control.177 This fact illustrates the very possibility of having two Dalai Lamas 
after the current one passes away, “one approved by Chinese and one endorsed by the 
Tibetans.”178 This is the same controversy as the Panchen Lama reincarnation. 
A “free” country out of China’s control could be anywhere, but the reincarnation 
would have different impacts on international policy. A reincarnation would challenge 
                                                 
176Shurkhuu in discussion. 
177 “Dalai's reincarnation will not be found under Chinese control,” The Government of  Tibet in 
Exile, July 6, 1999, http://www.tibet.com/DL/next-reincarnation.html (accessed July 17, 2006). 
178 Philip J. Barton, Tibet and China: History, Insurgency, and Beyond . (Master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, June 2003), 104. 
68 
the host country’s policy toward China. The Tibetan government-in-exile would continue 
to contest China’s sovereignty in Tibet, using religion as an instrument.  
Mongolia is not excluded from the possible host countries. A Mongolian Dalai 
Lama would likely enjoy popular support not only from Tibet and (Outer) Mongolia, but 
also from Inner Mongolia. This reincarnation would definitely challenge China’s policy 
with Mongolia, which would have a direct impact on China’s international reputation. 
a.  Panchen Lama Case 
The most important issue today is the disputed Panchen Lama’s 
reincarnation, which resulted in two Panchen Lamas. China announced a six-year-old boy 
as the next figure of the Panchen Lama in 1996, whose previous figure had deceased in 
1989. This contradicted the Dalai Lama’s announcement of another boy as the Panchen 
Lama. The Panchen Lama recognized by the Dalai Lama soon disappeared. The lama, 
who found this Panchen Lama and brought to the Dalai Lama, is not found either. 
The dispute between the Dalai Lama and China’s government stems from 
different interpretations of the recognition process. As a divine science, recognition of 
reincarnation always fell under the Dalai Lama’s or big lamas’ authority, because they 
can read the signs of rebirth. If the readings of these signs show that one is the next figure 
of a deceased lama without any doubt, the fact was called “reincarnation in mind.” The 
recognition process, however, has not always gone smoothly throughout history. The 
Manchu Emperor, a patron of Lamaism, took a leading role in drawing lots from a golden 
urn to make the final decision if several candidates were found for the reincarnation.179  
Based on this historical legacy, the two parties hold differing views. The Dalai 
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reincarnation.180 China, on the other hand, blames the Dalai Lama for not drawing lots 
from a golden urn. For China, the central government always participated in drawing 
lots.181  
This case is significant because it reveals the intentions of both sides-- the 
Dalai Lama’s interest in keeping the religious string of Tibetan life in his hands and 
China’s attempt to keep the Dalai Lama out of any issues in Tibet, including those 
pertaining to religion. Moreover, the same situation could repeat itself with the 
recognition of the next Dalai Lama. 
b.  Dalai Lama and Tibetan Government-in-Exile 
Two constitutional provisions have constituted the main goals of the 
Tibetan government-in-exile’s policy since 1961, when the draft of the constitution was 
presented to and rejected by the People’s Deputies (the Tibetan legislative body-in-exile). 
These are the separation of church and state and the transition from a monarchic rule to a 
republic. These provisions, restated in 1992, not only introduce democracy and change to 
the traditional governance of Tibet, but also have significant strategic implications for the 
future of Tibet and the Dalai Lama, as well as his following reincarnations’ role in 
Tibetan society. 
These would be steps towards democratization of the Tibetan government 
following the “principles of modern democracy.”182 The Dalai Lama would be the leader 
of all Buddhists, like the Pope for Roman Catholics, and give up his throne to the secular 
and republican government-in-exile. He defines himself as “a monk involved in national 
struggle,” but spends 80 percent of his energy in the spiritual field.183 Tashi Wangdi  
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explains that “he might be the last Dalai Lama who ruled the religion and government in 
one hand.” 184 Indeed, the Dalai Lama has several times stated the possibility of granting 
the title of the Dalai Lama in the same way of choosing a Pope, and not in a traditional 
way of reincarnation.185 
However, the parliament-in-exile blocked the constitutional amendments 
to make such changes. “Tibetan people are not ready to accept such radical change, 
“Tashi Wangdi explains, “even though the Dalai Lama does it for [the] benefit of all 
Tibetans.”186  
These amendments to the constitution would not only be significant to 
democratization of the government-in-exile, but also to the strategy for dealing with 
China after the current Dalai Lama passes away. The separation of church and state 
would likely facilitate the Tibetan government-in-exile’s peaceful reconciliation of the 
Tibet issue with China. China will never accept a theocratic style of governance in its 
autonomous regions. If the government-in-exile is secular, Tibet and China could reach 
an agreement in a somewhat similar way to the unification of Hong Kong and Macao.  A 
republican form of governance would also enable the government-in-exile to avoid 
recognition of the Tibetan King in the case of a possible dispute between two 
reincarnated Dalai Lamas, such as Panchen Lama’s reincarnation case.187  
Tibetan activists do not rule out the possibility of the reincarnation of the 
Dalai Lama in Mongolia. "According to [the] theory of reincarnation, [the] soul seeks for 
a place that it can feel comfortable in terms of religion and culture," Bhuchung Tsering 
explains.  "Next to Tibet, Mongolia may be a place where the Dalai Lama can find 
himself at home. [The] Importance of reincarnation of the Dalai Lama in Mongolia," he 
continues, "is it would prove him to be a global Buddhist leader, and not just of 
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Tibetans."188 He is sure that if the current Dalai Lama's religious role in Mongolia is 
emphasized enough by Mongolians, it could help Mongolia avoid possible Chinese 
pressure in the case of his reincarnation in the country. 
Unlike Bhuchung Tsering, Tashi Wangdi highlights the purpose of 
reincarnation -- continuing the cause one started, but left incomplete in the previous life. 
Mongolia is economically weak and dependent on China – conditions that are not 
conducive to the continuation of the Dalai Lama’s cause. However, Mongolia has 
numerous historical and religious advantages. One of the previous incarnations was a 
Mongolian; Mongolians belongs to the same Mahayana sect; and the Dalai Lama enjoys 
popular respect in the country. Tashi Wangdi explains that the Dalai Lama can 
reincarnate anywhere in the Buddhist countries -- Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, or 
Mahayana Mongolia.189 
The Tibetan strategy of secularism and republicanism would enable the 
Tibetan government-in-exile to peacefully reconcile the Tibet issue with China  and avoid 
the potential problem of recognizing two Dalai Lamas in the future. Tibetan officials 
probably debate the positives and negatives of such a reincarnation.  
2.  How Will China's Military Threat Affect Mongolian Policy? 
China is the most important external factor, especially in terms of military power. 
Military leaders debate the Mongolian Armed Forces’ (MAF) capability of defending the 
country from major powers like Russia and China. Although protection of the nation by 
purely military means is very dubious, some military leaders argue that they are indeed 
capable.. China’s  military threat is limited by Beijing’s relationship with other great 
powers and its international prestige among other nations, which may be more valuable 
than an invasion of Mongolia. 
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a.  Mongolia’s Self-Defense Capability 
Military leaders have different opinions about Mongolia’s self-defense 
capability; however, they agree that the use of military for the purpose of supporting the 
Mongolian foreign policy effort to elevate the country’s international prestige is the best 
way of ensuring national security with military means. Since the end of the Cold War and 
the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolia, the Mongolian Armed Forces (MAF) 
have had to justify their existence and find their place in a democratic society. Article 11 
of the constitution of Mongolia states that "Mongolia maintains armed forces for self-
defense.”190  
Whether Mongolia is able to defend itself from a foreign aggressor is one 
of the main debates. Brigade General Sosorbaram Chimiddorj believes that no country's 
first choice would be by military means if the Mongolian Armed Forces are strong and 
enough to sustain an attack. He calls this "Doorstep Theory," explaining that the doorstep 
should be high enough for foreign invaders.191 Major General Mygmar Dovchin 
believes that Mongolia could mobilize at least 100,000 troops in the case of a mass 
invasion, which would be strong enough to require an invader to have at least 500,000 
troops. This scale of military conflict would not remain local, gradually escalating to a 
regional problem and attracting the regional and global powers' interests and 
interventions. No great power can easily invade any small country if the small power 
successfully organizes the defense and mobilizes its resources, as in Chechnya and 
Afghanistan. 192 
Others view Mongolia as incapable of defending itself from its neighbors. 
In Lieutenant General Molomjamts Luvsangombo Namnan’s opinion, it is impossible for 
an army of 10,000 to defend 1.5 million square kilometers of territory against 2 million 
Chinese troops. Mongolia would have been able to defend itself if it were in Europe, 
where neighbors are small. However, Russia and China are both undoubtedly military 
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powers with both human and technological advantages over Mongolia. Therefore, the 
MAF cannot fulfill its genuine function of defending the country, despite its 
constitutional obligation. The only meaningful function of the troops is peacekeeping 
missions to raise Mongolia’s national prestige in the UN and among friendly nations, 
thereby using political and diplomatic means of ensuring security.193 Mrs. Oyun 
Sanjaasuren Ulaalzai-Hoegduud, a member of parliament, asserts that most politicians 
share this opinion.194 
A compromise of both sides of debate points to military reform. Mongolia, 
on the one hand, still implements conscription and universal military duty; however, the 
number of those conscripted has significantly decreased and the service term has been 
shortened. Current defense reform, on other hand, focuses on UN Peacekeeping 
operations (PKO).  
Participating in UN PKO is the first and most important achievement of 
Mongolian military reform. This is the only rational use of the military to support the 
political and diplomatic means of ensuring national seucirty.195 MAF UN PKO 
deployment can be regarded as an “active self-defense,” complementing the 
constitutional provisions.196 
b.  Chinese Limits 
Whether Mongolia is able to defend itself or not, China has limits to its 
military capacity. China's relationship with Russia and Chinese foreign policy principles 
likely prevent Beijing from taking severe military action against Mongolia. 
Mongolia is a buffer state between Russia and China. Both great powers 
have vested interest in the buffer state's neutral existence to keep a military and geo-
political balance between them. A chinese military threat to Mongolia, therefore, would 
definitely affect Russia's security interest. Both countries depict their relationship as a 
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strategic partnership; however, it is dubious how long that can last.197 Great power-to-
great power relations and geographic proximity are the factors that tend to escalate 
disputes to military conflict.198 
It is unlikely that China would go against its best-selling foreign policy 
principle of “peaceful co-existence.”  Unlike Taiwan, Mongolia is an independent nation 
recognized by the international community, including the People's Republic of China. 
China is less willing to break its foreign policy principle of peaceful co-existence and 
respecting the sovereignty of a nation.  This is the “core of the Chinese Government’s 
foreign policy,” used as an argument for the “peaceful rise” of China.199 Using military 
power would likely harm its relationships with other countries. 
China would have difficulties acquiring legitimacy for its military action 
against Mongolia, whether it was a partial or full invasion. According to Ikenberry’s 
theory, this is because of a reduced return of power of the international institutions. It is 
unlikely that the UN Security Council, where Russia has a seat and right of veto, would 
allow China to take military action against a legitimate UN member. This is, in fact, the 
lock-in effect for China, as Ikenberry's theory states. China, unlike the United States, is 
an emerging power, not a status quo power, and therefore has less capacity for unilateral 
action. 
Military invasion, therefore, is not China’s first option. Such action would 
have risk China’s  “peaceful rise,” and would affect China’ relationship with other 
countries. It would also be constrained by international institutions that would increase 
the cost of military action. 
3.  How Mongolia's Economic Dependence on China Will Affect Its 
Policy? 
a.  Dependence on China 
Mongolia's economic dependence on China will greatly affect its policy 
toward China. Unlike Taiwan, Mongolia has not developed a strategy to avoid its 
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increasing economic dependence on China. Mongolia is dependent on China and will 
remain so. The volume of bilateral trade between these two countries takes one-third of 
Mongolian foreign trade, as the Institute of International Studies estimates. This trend is 
growing. In 2005-2006, bilateral trade rose from 30% to 40%. 200 
Increasing economic dependence on China makes Mongolia more 
vulnerable to economic sanctions. The Mongolian economy was greatly devastated when 
China closed its railway system in 2002, during the Dalai Lama's visit in Mongolia. 
Shurkhuue describes that the upply of goods suddenly stopped, demand increased, and 
prices rose dramatically during this period, as.201 About 700 small merchants were 
blocked on both sides of the border, Mr. Bold Ravdan recalls that trade flow between the 
countries stopped. The goods supply to the central market of Ulaanbaatar was cut due to 
the railroad closure and food supply shortages were observed on a small scale in ten 
provinces.202  
This case illustrates how dependent Mongolia is on China and how easily 
Chinese economic sanctions can devastate this country. Mongolia currently has no means 
to balance China's growing economic influence. Ulaanbaatar seeks a powerful neighbor 
to balance its dependence on the Chinese economy so that the 2002 railroad system 
closure is not repeated. Unfortunately, the surrounding economies of Mongolia do not 
care about poor, small and ineffective economic reform. 
Russian economic downfall no longer promises a reliable and effective 
balance against China, even though Russian businessmen still control a large share of 
Mongolian heavy industry. Erdenet, a copper and molybdenum refining factory that 
provides a huge part of the national budget, has a Russian share of 49%.203 Mongolian 
Railways, which is the only company that runs Mongolia’s only railroad connected 
Russia and China, is also partially owned by a Russian company. In addition, Russians 
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control almost all of the oil imports. However, these economic influences are less 
effective in balancing the growing Chinese economic influence. 
U.S., Korean and Japanese economic participation is insignificant 
compared to that of China. In 2004, imports from Korea accounted for only 6.7%, and 
Japanese imports accounted for 8.4%. The United States is not even mentioned as a main 
trade partner.204 Although these countries are the main donors of Mongolian democracy 
and market transition, their trade and investment share is insufficient to balance China’s 
economic influence over Mongolia. 
Although bilateral economic dependence between individual countries is 
dramatically increasing, there is no official regional economic cooperation in Central 
Asia or Northeast Asia in which Mongolia could participate. ASEAN is the only effective 
and successful regional economic cooperation, and Ulaanbaatar made great efforts to join 
it.205 Mongolia became a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1998, and it joined 
the Asia Cooperation Dialogue in 2004.206  However, full membership in APEC, PECC 
and other regional organizations are far in the horizon. The fact that Mongolia is not a 
Southeast Asian country and that Mongol-ASEAN trade is insignificantly low make the 
country unimportant to ASEAN. 
Under these circumstances, Chinese economic sanctions on Mongolia 
would have a devastating effect, but only in the short run. Sustaining these sanctions 
requires consent of other countries, and in particular, Russia’s commitment. The Soviet 
Union encouraged Mongolian nationalists to strengthen their influence under China’s 
threat to Mongolian independence. In the same way, Russia and others may expel the 
Chinese from the Mongolian economy. In the long-term, this will shift the balance of 
power between Russia and China in Mongolia's favor of Russia. 
Even if Russia went along with Chinese economic sanctions, neither 
country would follow through on the long-term, at least for two reasons. First, such 
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sanctions would ruin Mongolia economically and politically, the results of which would 
be unpredictable. Secondly, the sanctions would create an economic power vacuum in the 
huge buffer zone between the two major powers. Each power would fear that the other 
would take an advantage of this vacuum.  
4.  International Environment 
The international environment and pressures from great powers have a significant 
affect on a small power’s foreign and security policy. As a small power, Mongolia is 
vulnerable to its great neighbors’ policies. Mongolia’s current “third neighbor policy” 
clearly reflects an external balancing strategy to balance its powerful two neighbors with 
other global and regional powers. In this policy, the United States is considered as a 
strategic “third neighbor,” and India as a “cultural” Neighbor.207 The following section 
will examine the regional powers’ interests and current policies with Tibetan and 
Mongolian affairs, which will be the basis of their policies in the case of the Dalai 
Lama’s reincarnation in Mongolia. 
a.  China 
(1) China’s Tibet Policy. China firmly considers Tibet its integral 
territory. This is the fundamental principle of its policy with Tibet. Any other policy with 
Tibet would be viewed as an external interruption in China’s domestic policy. The Dalai 
Lama’s actions to free Tibet, therefore, are seen as “splittist,” and India’s asylum for him 
is seen as an external interference in China’s internal affairs. 
“Marxism, with its search for historical ‘laws,’” John Garver 
writes, “coincides with and reinforced China’s hoary concern with the past.”208  The 
occupation of Indian-claimed Himalayan territories was driven by nationalism. The myth 
of national humiliation, which is the basis of this Chinese ideology, justified the 
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occupation of Tibet as an act of cleaning the historical semi-colonial shame posed by the 
British Empire in the early 20th century.209 
The nationalist nature of China's foreign policy was evident, 
especially with regard to the issue of Tibet. Mao Zedong recognized that “the major 
problem is not the problem of the McMahon line, but the Tibet question.” He maintained, 
“In the opinion of the Indian government, Tibet is theirs.”210 As a successor to the British 
Empire, India was perceived as an imperialist power that claimed China’s lawful 
territory.  
China’s policy has retained this nationalist sentiment. China 
condemns the Dalai Lama as a traitor who wants to divide China. 
The reincarnation of the Dalai Lama in Mongolia would likely 
enjoy great support not only from Tibetans, but also from the Mongolian Diasporas in 
China. Mongolian nationalism, its support of the Dalai Lama, and its economic 
cooperation with Taiwan are China’s foremost security concerns with regard to Mongol-
U.S. military cooperation.211 Although 4 million Mongolian Diasporas makes up only 
17% of the total Inner Mongolian population, it could have a potential negative impact on 
Mongol-Chinese relations.212 
(2) China’s Policy Options. The Dalai Lama and the Tibetan 
government-in-exile constitute a threat to China’s territorial integrity that affects the 
Tibetan Autonomous Region. The reincarnation of the Dalai Lama in Mongolia could 
double the threat, affecting Inner Mongolia as well. Dealing with this issue would likely 
require a similar strategy as China’s Taiwan policy. 
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Military invasion is not the first choice. Any military action would 
affect Sino-Russian relations and could escalate into a military conflict, as the invasion of 
Tibet did to Indo-Chinese relations. Such action would also devastate its claim for 
“peaceful rise” and lead to tensions throughout the region. Imposing economic sanctions 
on Mongolia would be a more effective than military action. However, this would require 
Russian commitment to sustain the sanctions in the long run.  
The most likely option for China would be similar to Beijing’s 
current policy with Taiwan. This would be CCP collaboration with the anti-Dalai Lama 
bloc of Mongolian politics to minimize the Dalai Lama’s influence in the country and try 
to control him through those parties. In this regard, according to Professor Shurkuu, 
China may be interested in the 15th Dalai Lama's reincarnation in Mongolia.213 Beijing 
would have greater oversight over the Dalai Lama in Mongolia than in India. Beijing has 
more means of influence over Mongolia than India. 
Meanwhile, China would encourage economic relations with 
Mongolia, which would certainly make Ulaanbaatar more dependent on Beijing. Even 
today, Mongolia has a vested interest in Chinese stability and prosperity, simply because 
of its growing dependence on China. Any instability in China would have a direct and 
harmful impact on Mongolia, just as those of the Soviet Union had before. This 
dependence would assure Beijing that Ulaanbaatar would never pose a threat. 
b.  Russia 
(1) Russian Policy. Russia depicts its relationship with China as a 
strategic partnership, and Moscow supports Beijing’s policy with the Dalai Lama in order 
to preserve this partnership. This policy is important for Russia to sustain economic and 
political support from China; however, how this partnership can endure is an interesting 
question. 
Russia attempts to find a delicate balance between maintaining a 
good relationship with China and meeting its Buddhist minorities’ needs. Three Buddhist 
regions of Russia -- Kalmykia, Tuva and Buriyats -- are home to Mongol tribes that share 
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ethnic and religious backgrounds with Mongolians. The Dalai Lama visited Russia in 
1992 and had a one-day transit visa in 1995, on his way to Mongolia.214 The Dalai Lama 
finally visited Russia in 2004, following three denials of visa over more than a decade. In 
response to the Chinese government's criticism, the Russian government explained that 
the issuance of a visa was purely for the religious needs of its minorities. 215 
Russia’s interest in collaborating with China is focused on three 
areas of strategic interest -- arms sales, Central Asia, and economic relations. Arms sales 
sustain Russia's military industrial complex and retain its status as a world class military 
power despite the economic difficulties it currently experiences. Cooperation in Central 
Asia helps to keep Muslim terrorists far from the border, while securing the region’s rich 
energy resources from U.S. global hegemonic reach.216  
Despite these near-term advantages, Russia faces challenges. 
Russians debate whether its military and technological cooperation with China is 
threatened.217 Sherman Garnett describes three possible circumstances that could end the 
Sino-Russian strategic partnership -- uncontrolled Islamic resurgence in Central Asia, 
increased Chinese population in the Russian Far East, and a shift of balance of power 
between the two states.218 Chinese military action, such as an invasion of Mongolia, 
therefore, would surely change the balance of power and would end the Sino-Russian 
cooperation. Russia is concerned about Mongolia “drifting away from Russia toward 
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China”219 in political and economic terms, but hopes that deep cultural ties established 
during the Soviet era can sustain the relationship on a certain level. 
With regard to the Dalai Lama, Russia faces the dilemma of 
keeping its strategic partnership with China and responding to its people’s religious 
needs, as well as Mongolia’s. Its partnership with China is valuable and helps Russia to 
overcome the difficulties it faces today; however, it may become brittle as China grows 
and modernizes at Russia’s expense. 
(2) Russia’s Policy Options. Russia would not support Mongolia in 
the Dalai Lama issue; however, it would defend Mongolia against China in the case of 
Chinese invasion.  
Mongolia's relationship with Russia is fading and Mongolia is 
becoming increasingly dependent on China rather than Russia. For Russia, China is more 
important than Mongolia; therefore, the current Russian policy of supporting China 
against the Dalai Lama would be unlikely to change. Thus Russian policy would remain 
the same. 
Russia, however, would not tolerate any hostile action taken by 
China against Mongolia that would change the balance of power between Russia and 
China. It also seeks an opportunity to strengthen its political and economic influence 
again. Both the Past Action and Current Calculus theories guarantee Russian military 
assistance to Mongolia in the case of a Chinese military threat. The Soviet Union 
defended Mongolia against Japanese invasion in Khalkiin Gol in 1939. Soviet military 
installations were based in Mongolia during its coldest period with China. Furthermore, 
Chinese illegal immigration in the Russian Far East is one of the main problems of the 
Russo-Chinese relationship. A Chinese invasion or military threat to Mongolia would 
definitely shift the balance of power in favor of China, and the bilateral strategic 
partnership will be finished, as was the case of Sino-Indian relation in 1950’s, which 
ended with a war. 
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c.  India 
(1) Policy with the Dalai Lama. India would likely support the 
reincarnation of the 15th Dalai Lama in Mongolia. Delhi is interested in developing a 
close and friendly relationship with China. Chinese plans of developing western regions 
promise Indian business a great joint future. Reincarnation of the Dalai Lama would 
provide two opportunities -- liberating it from a face-to-face problem with China, and 
backing Mongolia in the Dalai Lama issue against China, as Chinese does for Pakistan on 
the nuclear issue. 
The Tibet issue is the root of all three current problems between 
China and India. The border disputes, the Dalai Lama issue, and China’s support of 
Pakistan all derive from China’s peaceful liberation of Tibet. India considers Tibet its 
sphere of influence inherited from the British Empire and a buffer against China. China’s 
occupation of Tibet in 1951, however, “vanished (it) overnight.”220 The balance of power 
between regional powers shifted, and India felt threatened by China. As long as the issue 
of Tibet exists, the two emerging powers cannot resolve their conflicts. The issue of Tibet 
is therefore an important strategic variable in Sino-Indian relations. 
In contrast, India had a friendly policy towards China in the early 
1950's.  Indian Prime Minister Nehru’s strategy with China in the early 1950’s was to 
support Beijing among newly independent post-colonial countries, because the isolation 
of China would cause it to depend more on the USSR and increase its belligerent 
behavior toward other Asian countries.221 India actively supported China in order to 
establish a good relationship with post-colonial countries at the Bandung Conference in 
1955. India’s government recognized China’s sovereignty over Tibet in 1954. However, 
the two countries have continuously attempted to challenge one another since Sino-Indian 
War . India used Soviet support against China, which in fact led the United States to 
support China. 
The three main issues in Sino-Indian relations are "unresolved 
boundary (and territorial) issues, Tibet, and the Pakistan factor," as Du Youkang 
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describes.222 The territorial disputes derive from the Simla Treaty. China does not accept 
the border demarcation between British India and Tibet that is drawn by this treaty, 
which the Nationalist government of the day had never signed. India requires China to 
observe the only documented border line between the two countries, which is the Simla 
Treaty.  
To counter-balance India’s policy of building a buffer along the 
Sino-Indian border and its policy with the Himalayan Kingdoms, China has backed 
Pakistan against India. New Delhi suspects that China is providing nuclear technology to 
Pakistan. This was the main justification of India’s nuclear test in 1998.223   
India provides asylum to the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan 
government-in-exile. The Dalai Lama, who is the legitimate king of Tibet, resides in 
Dharmasala, a city in Northern India. He exposes China’s cultural genocide in Tibet and 
promotes a “free Tibet.” China sees the Dalai Lama’s action as an attempt at “splitting 
the nation.”224 
(2) Indian Policy Options. India has no reason not to support the 
Dalai Lama’s reincarnation in Mongolia.  
Delhi might have some advantages in this scenario, according to 
Professor Shurkhuu. The reincarnation of the next Dalai Lama in Mongolia, on the one 
hand, would eliminate one of its problems with China. India is interested in the Chinese 
western region’s development and desires to invest and have a good share in its profitable 
projects. Improving its relationship would definitely promote its interest in this capacity. 
India, meanwhile, will still have the Dalai Lama card to play 
against China if necessary.  The buffer status of Tibet and the Dalai Lama will likely to 
remain an important leverage in India’s policy with China because complete resolutions 
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of Sino-Indian territorial disputes are nowhere on the horizon. Reincarnation of the Dalai 
Lama would strengthen Indian interest in Mongolia. India is considered the cultural 
neighbor of Mongolians.225 India’s first ambassador, Bakula Rinpoche, was a Buddhist 
monk after Mongolia's transition from a communist regime to a democracy. He had close 
relations with the Dalai Lama.226 India likely has interest to use Mongol-Tibetan and 
Indian cultural ties to contend with China. 
d.  The United States 
(1) U.S. Tibet Policy. U.S. policy with Tibet was always designed 
in the context of its China strategy. Washington seems to fail to recognize the strategic 
importance of the Tibet issue in broader terms as a means of controlling two emerging 
regional powers, India and China. Moreover, the Dalai Lama issue could potentially 
affect a vast strategic mass, ranging from the Himalayas to the Mongolian step.  
In the early days of the PRC, the U.S. operations ST CITRUS and 
MUSTANG supported Tibetan rebel movements with the intent to contend with 
communist China in the Himalayan region.227 This support was limited due to India's 
pro-China policy and the physical distance between the United States and Nepal, where 
the military training bases were located. Furthermore, events with a direct strategic 
importance, such as the Korean War and the Cuban Missile Crisis, required more U.S. 
attention. 
When the Soviet Union backed India against China in 1962, the 
United States cooperated with the PRC and gave up its Tibet policy until the very end of 
the Cold War.  From 1972 to 1987, Washington recognized Tibet as a part of China and  
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took no action “to provoke Beijing by supporting the Tibetan nationalists' demands.”228 
Preserving good relations with China was more important in the U.S. global strategy of 
the Cold War.  
The end of the Cold War changed the strategic calculation of all 
countries of the world, especially the United States. Under strong congressional pressure, 
President Bush became the first president to meet the Dalai Lama.229 President Clinton 
“created the position of Special Coordinator for Tibetan issues, tasked with the specific 
mission of helping to promote talks between the Dalai Lama and Beijing.”230 President 
George W. Bush appointed Ms. Paula Dobriansky, Under Secretary of State for Global 
Affairs, making her “the highest ranking U.S. official to have held this position.”231 The 
Tibet issue seemed to be gaining attention. 
The United States officially recognized Tibet as a part of the PRC; 
however, a pro-Tibetan group in the U.S. Congress has had a role in shaping the policy. 
This group calls for a radical review of the current U.S. Tibet policy.  They introduced 
“Tibet’s Legal Status and China’s Sovereignty Claims Act” in May 1991, calling for the 
United States to recognize Tibet as a country under illegal occupation of the PRC.232 This 
proposal was too radical to become a law. This act rightfully pointed out that Mongol rule 
over Tibet during the Yuan Dynasty provides no historic justification for Chinese claim. 
But it failed to realize the modern importance of Mongol-Tibetan cultural ties in U.S. 
policy with China. 
The controversy between Congress and the president in Tibetan 
affairs was clearly observed in 1995 and 1996. Pro-Tibetan legislators demanded the 
president delay his visit to China “until there had been a marked improvement in respect  
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for human rights in both China and Tibet.”233 President Clinton objected to the demand, 
“asserting that the bill contained many unacceptable provisions that would undercut U.S. 
leadership abroad.”234  
U.S. policy with Mongolia has traditionally been determined 
within the framework of its policy with the Soviet Union and China. Washington has 
only recognized Mongolia since 1987 and has had no strategic interest in Mongolia. Until 
Mongolia actively engaged in U.S. led military operations such as Enduring Freedom and 
Iraqi Freedom, it only provided moral support for Mongolian democracy. Current U.S. 
assistance is based on short-term interest with regard to the war against terrorism, but 
Mongolia still has no strategic importance due to its land-locked location.  
U.S. policy is similar with Mongolia and Tibet. Both countires are 
land-locked and impossible to reach from the sea. Both of them can be regarded in U.S. 
policy with regional powers such as India, China and Russia, albeit insignificantly. 
Washington fails to see Mongolia and Tibet in the context of their close cultural ties, 
which have historically always had a major importance in the policies of Chinese 
Dynasties.  
(2) U.S. Policy Option. The Tibet issue is one of the significant 
variables of Indo-Chinese relations. It is therefore too important for Washington to 
ignore. 
The United States is not affected directly by the Dalai Lama’s 
reincarnation, as India, China, Russia and Mongolia are. U.S. policy options, therefore, 
are numerous, ranging from idle abstention to active leadership. All of these policies can 
be summarized in four possible options: do-nothing, support of China, support of India 
and strategic ambiguity. 
The support-India policy is unacceptable for the United States for 
several reasons. This policy would have a negative effect on current U.S.-China relations. 
China’s growing nationalism and reflected policy may impair bilateral relations, leading 
the two countries to a new Cold War. A strong and effective independence movement in 
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Tibet may lead to a domino effect, reviving separatist sentiments of Uighurs in Xinjiang 
and Mongolians in Inner Mongolia. These trends would shake China’s domestic stability 
in today’s radical economic and social reform. The consequences of this are difficult to 
predict. China could collapse as the Soviet Union did, leaving the region unstable. If 
China survived this shake, it could turn back to dictatorship, rolling back all of today’s 
positive trends. The option of supporting India and the Tibetan independence would not 
lead to desirable consequences. 
Supporting China’s policy with Tibet would also be dangerous for 
the United States. The policy would have at least the following negative impacts: It may 
strengthen U.S.-China relations for the short- term; however, China would remain the 
strategic competitor and Washington would gain nothing more than it has now. The U.S. 
reputation of the superpower that enhances and supports universal human rights would be 
damaged. Allies would be skeptical of  the U.S. commitment to democracy. The United 
States would be unable to use a Dalai Lama card with China with no reciprocity. 
Strategic ambiguity prevents the Sino-India -Tibetan dispute from 
escalating into regional instability. Expanding the almost bilateral three-actor relations 
between them into triangular or quasi-quadrangular relations provides more room for 
every actor, except for China. Doing so, the United States can maintain its role in the 
conflicting issue between two emerging regional powers. 
Increasing the U.S. role in the Dalai Lama and Tibet issue would 
eventually change the calculation of all of the actors. Only China’s adversarial position 
toward the Dalai Lama would remain the same as it was during the Cold War, as opposed 
to the other actors’ positions that have already softened-- the Dalai Lama gave up the 
Tibetan independence claim and India has a growing interest in western regions 
development program of Chinese government. China could revise its policy and take 
steps to accept a softer policy toward the issue, due to the increasing U.S. factor. 
The Tibet issue, therefore, may find its convenient resolution with 
active U.S. involvement. U.S. strategic ambiguity may lead two regional powers to 
compete for U.S. support for the issue, reducing tensions. Active U.S. support of 
Mongolia in the Dalai Lama issue would send a strong message of Washington’s 
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commitment to human rights and democracy without encouraging India and China. This 
would increase the U.S. role in disputed issues between the emerging two regional 
powers. 
C.  CONCLUSION 
Mongolia has every reason to support the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama in 
Mongolia. The national policy would therefore directly depend on the international 
situation. The China factor plays a significant role as both an external and internal factor.  
The domestic political situation involves the China factor and the religious needs 
of the population. The political leaders are already divided into supporters and opponents, 
and both sides have strong arguments regarding the issue. 
The external environment of Mongolia would not change dramatically; however, 
the pressure on Mongolia from its immediate neighbors would likely be intense. Luckily, 
it is unlikely that China sould threaten Mongolia with military power because of Russia’s 
interest in Mongolia. Economic sanctions might be a preferred option for Beijing to use; 
however, this would require Russian commitment in order for them to be effective. China 
would likely collaborate with anti-Dalai Lama political parties in order to limit the role of 
the Dalai Lama -- the same policy it currently pursues with regard to Taiwan. 
Under these circumstances, Mongolia needs support from the international 
community. India is likely to support Mongolia to contend with its old rival.  The Tibetan 
government-in-exile policy of separation of power would have promoted the security of 
Mongolia vis-à-vis China. 
U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity could have a positive impact on every actor of 
reincarnation politics. It would change the calculation of all actors and promote stability 
in a wide region, from the Mongolian plateau to the Himalayan mountains. This 
involvement would preserve democracy in Mongolia and Russia, and peace between 
India and China. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
A. PRESENT AND PROSPECTIVE 
A small state’s interaction with a great power depends of factors such as the type 
of domestic political regime, the intensity of the threat from an aggressor, and the 
availability of alliance. A combination of these factors will determine whether Mongolian 
politicians will favor voters’ religious preferences over China’s security interests in the 
case of the next Dalai Lama’s reincarnation. The case of Taiwan’s independence claim 
paints a complicated picture about likely developments in Ulaanbaatar and China’s 
possible reaction. 
Mongolia will likely try to maximize its interest in keeping its political regime 
and national identity. This is determined by voters’ religious preferences, but limited by 
the national security threat from China, in order to enhance the “third neighbor” policy, 
which aims to balance the U.S., Indian and Russian interests against China’s interests. It 
is unlikely that China would risk its relationship with other great powers, its growing 
reputation among the international community, and the best-selling foreign policy 
principles of a “peaceful rise” and “coexistence,” with a challenge from a weak, isolated 
buffer country like Mongolia, whose economy is heavily dependent on China. It would 
probably choose a peaceful means of eliminating a potential threat, such as cooperating 
with anti-Dalai Lama groups, just as Beijing does with Taiwan today. 
1.  Domestic Factors 
As a rational actor, Mongolia will attempt to maximize its interests. The question 
is whether it will give priority to security or democracy.  Domestic conditions in 
Mongolia are inclined to favor the Dalai Lama and maintain the Mongolian national 
identity. However, these factors often collide with Chinese security interests and meet 
resistance from Beijing, which could challenge the national security of Mongolia. The 
dilemma between responsiveness to voters’ preferences and national security, which 
surfaces every time the Dalai Lama visits, will likely become more crucial in domestic 
politics. 
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The Mongolian population sympathizes with the Dalai Lama since the Buddhism 
is a part of the Mongolian identity. Unlike Taiwan, who faces the dilemma of whether 
they should identify themselves as Chinese or Taiwanese, Buddhism is deeply rooted in 
Mongolia’s history and culture. Although the country has a Communist atheist legacy, 
the Buddhist identity is strong and will remain so in the near future .Frequent visits of the 
Dalai Lama have revealed that the Dalai Lama, the leader of Lamaism, enjoys the popular 
support of Mongolians, and this will remain the case if he reincarnates in Mongolia. 
Religion in Mongolia is not yet politicized, but surely will be if it faces a political 
challenge from China. 
The dilemma of democracy and security in Mongolia is reflected in policy 
making. On the one hand, the China factor plays an important role in Mongolian 
domestic politics, just as it does in foreign policy. Similarly, Beijing’s threat plays a 
conditional factor in Taiwanese public opinion, specifically, whether Taipei’s policy 
should be pro-independence or pro-unification. China takes advantage of Taiwan’s 
political system and cooperates with pro-unification parties to peacefully achieve its goal 
of extinguishing Taiwan’s claim to independence. Like Taiwan, Mongolian politics are 
open to many opinions and lobbies, , and there are many politicians and officials who are 
ready to stand against the Dalai Lama, as the 9th Jebtsundamba’s visit in 1999 illustrates. 
They are concerned about the China’s threat to national security and increasing 
Mongolian economic dependence on China. Beijing may cooperate with these anti-Dalai 
Lama political groups to peacefully achieve its security interest in the same way it does in 
Taiwan. On the other hand, pro-Dalai Lama political groups demand that the government 
be responsive to the religious needs of its people and respect the fundamental rights and 
freedom of its citizens, including the right to believe. These groups have different views 
on the principles of democracy and governance, and security challenges. The current 
political debate on Taiwan’s independence and unification presents a good analogy for 
the possible polarization of Mongolian politics in case of the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation, 
and this trend is observed even today in the opinions of different political leaders and 
government officials.. Indeed, the CCP already cooperates with major political parties of 
Mongolia and this cooperation would likely be strengthened to reduce the Mongol Dalai 
Lama’s influence. 
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The electorate and democracy are the decisive variables in the Mongolian 
government. Except for the China factor, Mongolians have every reason to support the 
Dalai Lama; therefore, the religious preference of the population is likely to outweigh 
China’s threat to its national identity, as shown by the Dalai Lama’s visits. The 
government of Mongolia should probably adjust its policy to it. In the decade-long 
history of Mongolian democracy, every parliamentary election has changed the ruling 
parties and punished them for their policy failures. To maintain popular support, the 
government will likely meet the public’s religious interests, and will try to balance 
Beijing’s pressure with other great powers’ interests, which is the only way to achieve 
domestic political goals. 
If the domestic political system pushes the government towards a pro-Dalai Lama 
policy, the international environment will be the primary factor shaping the intensity and 
character of Mongolian foreign policy as a small power. 
2.  External Factors 
External factors will be decisive in shaping Mongolia’s foreign and security 
policy. As a small, vulnerable power, Ulaanbaatar has no means to influence Beijing’s 
foreign policy, since China enjoys military and economic power. The buffer state nature 
of Mongolia and its international support are its only hope in countering the China factor. 
China’s position on the Dalai Lama issue will strongly shape Mongolia’s policy, 
just as it does in Taiwan’s policy for independence. Ulaanbaatar has described the Dalai 
Lama’s trips as purely religious affairs every time he visits Mongolia. Beijing, in turn, 
has sent Mongolia both diplomatic and economic warnings, closing the railroad and 
suspending high-ranking official’s visits. In the case of a reincarnation in Mongolia, 
Beijing would likely increase its pressure, and Mongolia could  find itself under military 
and economic pressure from China that is similar to what Taiwan experiences. Compared 
to Taiwan, Mongolia’s defense capability debatable and its economy is poor and isolated 
from Asian economic regionalism, such as ASEAN. 
China, however, has its limits. Military threat is not the first option for China 
because it would affect its relationship with other great powers and its reputation in the 
international community. Similarly, the Sino-U.S. relationship limits Chinese military 
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action with Taiwan, regardless of the fact that Beijing firmly considers Taiwan an 
integral part of its sovereign territory and Washington has recognized Chinese 
sovereignty over Taiwan. China has shown its commitment to war with the Anti-
Secession Law It has drawn a clear line for its military invasion, despite the fact that its 
power projection capability may be insufficient to achieve a quick victory over Taiwan. 
Mongolia has two fundamental advantages that make a similar Chinese threat less likely. 
First, Chinese military action would affect the balance of power against other regional 
powers. Because of Mongolia’s buffer state nature, Russia’s interest stands on the other 
end of the balance of power. The very existence of a buffer state relies on the competing 
powers’ mutual fear and relative balance of power. The current Russo-Chinese strategic 
partnership can only be achieved if the balance of power between the countries is 
maintained,235 and any hostile military action against Mongolia would end this 
partnership. The United States also has vested interest in Mongolian independence, 
because it is the pivot between the Russo-Chinese balance in the region. Changing this 
balance with military action is not permissible in the eyes of either Russia or the United 
States. Second, Mongolia is an UN member and an independent nation recognized by the 
international community, including China. Any military aggression against a sovereign 
nation would negatively affect China’s international reputation of “peaceful rise” and its 
best-selling foreign policy principle of “peaceful co-existence.” The limits that restrain 
China from invading Taiwan would exist for Mongolia as well.  
Chinese unilateral economic sanctions and blockades could be effective in the 
short run, but not in the long-term. Their effectiveness would depend on geopolitical 
circumstances. The Chinese unilateral naval blockade of Taiwan could be very effective, 
but it should consider U.S. support for Taiwan. Similarly, China could never effectively 
enforce Mongolia even economically without Russian commitment. In the long run, such 
a policy would reject a growing economic dependence of Mongolia on China that is a 
positive trend for Beijing. Mongolia would be pushed back toward Russia, making Outer 
Mongolia Russian again. Even if Russia agreed to economic sanctions, neither Moscow 
nor Beijing would likely follow through in the long-term, since such sanctions would ruin 
Mongolia economically and politically, the results of which are unpredictable. 
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Furthermore, the sanctions would create an economic power vacuum in the huge buffer 
zone between two major powers, and both sides would fear that other may would step in 
to take an advantage over it. 
International support is a crucial variable that directly affects Mongolia’s policy. 
The availability of alliances enables a small country to manipulate great powers’ interests 
for its own purpose. The United States suggests conditional support to Taiwan, which 
encourages Taipei to maximize it independence claim.. Because of Mongolia’s status as a 
buffer state, it will always have an available ally. Since the Soviet era, Russia has viewed 
Mongolia as a buffer state on which Russo-Chinese balance of power stand. Moscow 
would never tolerate hostile action from China because of its interest in Mongolia to keep 
its balance of power with China. Historical behavior and current calculus both assure 
Russian assistance in the worst case. Beyond this balance, Ulaanbaatar seeks a third 
neighbor’s support to maximize its fundamental interest of democracy. India and the 
United States play the most important roles in sustaining democracy and protecting 
fundamental human rights and freedom in Mongolia. Washington has a vested interest in 
the Russo-Chinese balance of power, which is the most important factor for regional 
security, along with Mongolian democracy and its third neighbor policy. India, which 
granted asylum to the Dalai Lama, has a specific cultural interest in Mongol-Tibetan 
cultural ties, and has appointed Bakula Rinpoche, a reincarnated Buddhist monk, as an 
ambassador of India in Ulaanbaatar. The same interest of these global and regional 
powers would also provide support  in the case of the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation in 
Mongolia. 
B. POLICY IMPLICATION 
Once the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama complicated the domestic and regional 
situation of Mongolia, the question is how Ulaanbaatar would handle it. This section 
describes the potential security situation of Western China and provides a 




1.  The Strategic Situation of Western China 
There would probably be two Dalai Lamas--one recognized by Tibetans, and 
another by the Chinese government. The two sides would contest which one is true, as 
with today’s case of the two competing Panchen Lamas. The Dalai Lama’s reincarnation 
in Mongolia would have greater regional security implications and would directly affect 
China’s security. The Mongol Dalai Lama would have influence not only in Tibetan 
Diasporas, but also with Inner Mongolians, which China’s government would unlikely 
welcome.236 Beijing could find itself in a triangular concern--Mongolia-Tibet-Taiwan-- 
which would have a dangerous impact on Mongolia.  
Mongolia should adjust its policy to avoid tension with China while reinforcing 
its relationships with other nations that could balance Beijing’s threat.  
2.  Mongolia’s Strategic Goal 
Mongolia’s strategic goal is twofold-- ensuring national security and sustaining 
democracy in Mongolia. Ensuring national security means avoiding a possible conflict of 
interests with China, or resolving the conflict with peaceful means. Sustaining democracy 
in Mongolia includes keeping the government responsive to its people and protecting 
fundamental human rights and freedom. These two interests are mutually exclusive 
because the government’s responsiveness to the people’s religious needs means 
recognition of a Mongol Dalai Lama, but China would demand recognition of other Dalai 
Lama.  
3.  Mongolia’s Strategic Options 
For Mongolia, maximizing interests means simultaneously achieving both goals-- 
sustaining democracy domestically, and ensuring national security externally. Sacrificing 
one for the other would not be the best option. A balancing strategy, therefore, is 
preferred over bandwagoning or appeasing China.  
Bandwagoning or appeasement provides no rational strategy for Mongolia. Such 
strategies could maximize security interests, but would fail to sustain democracy. 
Recognizing the Dalai Lama that China has recognized and abandoning the Dalai Lama, 
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who was born in Mongolia, would definitely be irresponsive, non-democratic behavior 
against the religious beliefs of its own people. Meanwhile, giving up an important 
leverage in foreign policy, such as the Dalai Lama, would also be an irrational step. 
To maximize its interest, Mongolia should simultaneously keep two balances-- 
one between internal and external factors, and another between China and the other great 
powers. Balancing China with the other great powers’ interests is Ulaanbaatar’s best 
choice. Such a strategy would respond to the people’s religious needs and sustain 
democracy; meanwhile, it might ensure Mongolian security in two ways. First, keeping 
the Dalai Lama in Mongolia would extend Ulaanbaatar’s religious and cultural influences 
beyond the ethnic ties with Inner Mongolia to Tibet. These strong ties could cause a 
considerable regional instability within China in the case of a direct Chinese military 
invasion the country. In this way, the Dalai Lama factor would increase the cost and risk 
of military invasion for China. Second, the reincarnated Dalai Lama would attract the 
attention of the international community, which would provide a good chance for 
Mongolia to pursue its “third neighbor” policy to overcome its landlocked and isolated 
geopolitical disadvantage. India’s asylum for the Tibetan government-in-exile and U.S. 
support of the current Dalai Lama show that the two nations would likely support 
Mongolia in such a case. 
Risk and opportunity go hand in hand. The balancing policy could lead to a threat 
from China; meanwhile, it may open opportunities to ensure its security in a broader 
range with the participation of other great powers. 
4.  Mongolia’s Policy Recommendations 
A strategy of external balancing with other powers is a challenging option for 
small Mongolia. Within the external balancing strategy, this thesis recommends two 
levels of policies--general and specific. The general policy is to sustain the current 
principles of Mongolia’s foreign and security policy. The “third neighbor” policy would 
provide international support for Mongolia and discourage a possible Chinese attack, 
increasing the cost of aggression. Its policy with neighbors should be reassurance. Russia 
is an important and powerful balancer in the case of hostile Chinese military or economic 
action. Mongolia should also assure China that Ulaanbaatar would never threaten Beijing. 
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Specific policy refers to the religious policy of Mongolia. Inviting the Jebtsundamba as a 
leader of Mongolian religion would be the best option for the government, thus avoiding 
recognizing the Dalai Lama and discussing his reincarnation. 
a.  Reassurance within the External Balancing 
Mongolia should pursue its current “third neighbor” policy. The “third 
neighbor” policy would prevent Mongolia from being locked in isolation between Russia 
and China. Taiwan’s international status leaves it with a limited availability of allies, 
which leaves no option but reliance on U.S. support. This lesson teaches Ulaanbaatar to 
take advantage on its sovereignty, and increase and strengthen its alliances. Close 
alliances with other great powers, such as the United States and India, that can balance 
both neighbors’ influence in Mongolia, should be a factor for an aggressor to consider. 
Mongolia’s current effort to join other regional economic and security organizations and 
dialogues is an important component of its “third neighbor” policy, since such 
international institutions diminish the return of power and considerably discourage 
aggressions from China. 
The “third neighbor” policy does imply that Mongolia should ignore its 
immediate neighbors. In geo-strategic terms, Russia is interested in Mongolia as a pivot 
of the Russo-Chinese balance of power and would likely assist Ulaanbaatar if Moscow 
viewed this balance as shifting in favor of Beijing. Therefore, Mongolia should reinforce 
its political and economic ties with Russia to strengthen Moscow’s interest in 
Ulaanbaatar. .  
Reassurance, meanwhile, may be Mongolia’s best policy with China to 
expose its non-hostile intentions if Beijing finds itself trapped in a Mongolia-Tibet-
Taiwan concern. Ulaanbaatar has already met the reality of economic dependence on 
China and has developed no plan to break away from such dependence. It should take 
advantage of this situation, since redirecting its economic trend is unaffordable even for 
Taiwan, a powerful regional economy. Furthermore, dependence would assure Beijing 
that Mongolia would never threaten China and, in turn, it may also change the PRC’s 
coercive policy in the case of the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation in Mongolia.  
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Mongolia’s observance of secular principles of governance should be 
consistent for China’s sake. Taiwan’s independence claim has been seen a unilateral 
change of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and every country has had to adjust to this 
change. China, in turn, has affirmed its commitment to war with the Anti-Secession Law, 
and the United States sees Taipei as a source of instability in the Strait. Ulaanbaatar’s 
support of the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation in Mongolia should be seen as predictable, 
consistent and non-threatening in eyes of the international community, including the 
Chinese, if the country has persistently observed its commitment to democracy, 
government responsiveness, human rights and secular principle. 
b.  Religious Administration Separate from Politics 
Mongolia needs an institution that has the authority to recognize the Dalai 
Lama’s next reincarnation and would liberate the government from recognizing the 
reincarnation of the next Dalai Lama. The last section discusses both conservative and 
radical options, and suggests the former.  
The conservative option is inviting theJebtsundamba and putting him in 
charge of religious issues, including the recognition of the next Dalai Lama. On the one 
hand, the religious needs of the Mongolian electorate would be satisfied. On the other 
hand, the Jebtsundamba would relieve the government of the huge task of recognizing the 
Dalai Lama’s reincarnation, which could lead down a collision course with China. 
Ulaanbaatar should simply accept the Jebtsundamba’s rule over such a reincarnation, 
since he would be the national religious leader.  
Supporting the Dalai Lama and making him the paramount leader of all 
world Buddhists is the most radical option. The Tibetan government-in-exile could name 
a child in the territory of Mongolia the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama, and Mongolian 
monasteries could support him as the true one, opposing one who would be found in 
China and recognized by Beijing.  The government of Mongolia should emphasize the 
religious role of the Dalai Lama as it does today, rather than his political activities. That 
would be seen as consistent with Mongolia’s current religious policy, and not a sudden 
hostile change of foreign policy with Beijing.  
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The radical policy to make the Dalai Lama the paramount leader of all 
Buddhists, however, has some disadvantages. First, it lacks historic rationale, and thus 
has less legitimacy. Second, supporting the Dalai Lama alone would appear as 
denouncing the Jebtsundamba, which would be problematic for Mongolians. Third, the 
government of Mongolia would be directly obliged to comment as to why Mongolia 
supported the Dalai Lama born in Mongolia, and not the Dalai Lama born in China, 
whom the Chinese government believes to be the true one. It would lead Ulaanbaatar to a 
direct confrontation with Beijing.  
Mongolian monasteries still lack strong religious leadership following the long 
communist oppression.237 As an institution, the monasteries are doubtful whether they 
can relieve the government from recognizing the Dalai Lama. The 9th Jebtsundamba has 
attempted to resolve the institutional problem derived from spontaneous salience by 
establishing his Religious Assembly and Administration during his short visit to 
Mongolia.238 Inviting the Jebtsundamba, therefore, would be the best choice for 
Mongolia. It would have full historical legitimacy, would be appropriate for national 
identity, and would save the government of Mongolia from a direct confrontation with 
China, meanwhile, keeping it in the center of attention of the international community.
                                                 
237 Ajaa Rinpoche in discussion. 
238 Bold, in discussion. 
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